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Climate change presents material – if not unparalleled – economic risks and opportunities to 
companies and investors, given changes in the physical environment brought about by climate 
change, and given regulatory efforts to limit those changes and adapt to the environment as it 
changes.  As a result of the increasing awareness of climate-related financial risks, shareholders 
are increasingly demanding strategic responses from their investee companies.  Institutional 
investors, such as public pension funds and asset managers, and insurers, in particular, have 
significantly increased their corporate engagement on climate change risk management, driven in 
part by a number of high-profile inquiries into their own financial and fiduciary exposures.  
 
One area of business practice to which regulators and investors have given particular attention is 
the disclosure by operating companies of risks and opportunities precipitated by climate change 
and transition initiatives, both mandatory disclosure pursuant to a country’s securities regime, and 
voluntary disclosure pursuant to leading initiatives such as CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure 
Project) or, more recently, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) Task Force on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures (“TCFD” or “Task Force”).  In this White Paper, we generally discuss the 
following questions related to (a) Canadian climate disclosure practices and (b) some liability issues 
engendered by those practices, in light of the transition to a lower-carbon economy: What is the 
Canadian federal and provincial framework for a transition to a lower-carbon economy?  What are 
current requirements, if any, for climate-related disclosure in light of that framework, and what is 
the quality of current climate disclosure by Canadian public companies? Can disclosure as 
anticipated by TCFD help promote serious attention at board and management levels to transition 
strategies?  What are the expectations by Canadian investors regarding disclosure of climate-
relevant information?  Finally, what liability risks are companies exposed to when they either 
misstate their opinions about the causes and consequences of climate change, or misstate or omit 
material facts about their businesses in light of climate change and the transition to a lower-carbon 
economy?  
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It is clear that climate change presents material – if not unparalleled – economic risks and 
opportunities to companies and investors, given changes in the physical environment brought 
about by climate change, and given regulatory efforts to limit those changes and adapt to the 
environment as it changes.2 Climate change awareness is motivating governments  to accelerate a 
transition to a low-carbon economy, seen most specifically in the global agreement by close to 200 
countries in Paris in December, 2015, to limit the warming of the Earth to “well under” 2º Celsius 
compared to the pre-industrial era, and “pursuing efforts” to limit to 1.5° Celsius.3  In Canada, the 
Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change has been agreed by the federal 
government and all of the provinces and territories with the exception of Saskatchewan in 
December, 2016, to meet Canada’s commitment to the Paris Agreement.4  That commitment is to 
reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030; the Pan-Canadian 
Framework uses establishing a price on carbon as its central policy tool to accomplish that goal.5   
It can be expected that the Pan-Canadian Framework will have a significant effect on companies 
not only in the oil, gas, coal, and energy sectors, most directly affected by the transition to a lower-
                                                     
1 This paper was written by Prof. Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, with research 
and writing contributions from Jordan Routliff, Class of 2018, Osgoode Hall Law School (Staff Notice 51-333); Ankita 
Gupta, Class of 2019, Osgoode Hall Law School (pension fund information); and Christina Renaud Milhomem, Schulich 
School of Business MBA Class of 2018 (pension fund information).   The financial support for this project was provided 
by the Ivey Foundation, which support is acknowledged with great appreciation.  Thanks are also due to Dr. Janis Sarra, 
Peter Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, for her careful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, 
and to Julie Desjardins for her comments on this draft, and with appreciation to the participants at roundtable 
discussions in Toronto and Calgary discussing the paper in draft.   
2 WEF (2016). The Global Risks Report 2016, World Economic Forum, Davos, January 2016. 
3 Paris Agreement, article 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015,  
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (“Article 2 (a): 
Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;”).  The Paris Agreement entered into force as of November 4, 2016, 
when countries representing 55% of global GHG emissions had ratified the Agreement.  By August, 2017, 160 countries 
have ratified the Agreement.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement: Status, 
available at:  http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php. 
4 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, December 9, 2016, available at 
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html.  
5 Ibid.  
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carbon economy, but in all sectors of the economy, given its effects on energy and transportation 
services.        
 
As a result of the increasing awareness of climate-related financial risks, shareholders are 
increasingly demanding strategic responses from their investee companies.6  Institutional 
investors, such as public pension funds and asset managers, and insurers, in particular, have 
significantly increased their corporate engagement on climate change risk management, driven in 
part by a number of high-profile inquiries into their own financial and fiduciary exposures.7  
 
One area of business practice to which regulators and investors have given particular 
attention is the disclosure by operating companies of risks and opportunities precipitated by 
climate change and transition initiatives, both mandatory disclosure pursuant to a country’s 
securities regime, and voluntary disclosure pursuant to leading initiatives such as CDP (formerly 
the Carbon Disclosure Project)8 or, more recently, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) Task Force 
on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD” or “Task Force”).9  In this White Paper, we 
generally discuss the following questions related to (a) Canadian climate disclosure practices and 
(b) some liability issues engendered by those practices, in light of the transition to a lower-carbon 
economy:     What are current requirements, if any, for climate-related disclosure, and what is the 
quality of current climate disclosure by Canadian public companies?  Can disclosure as anticipated 
by the FSB’s Task Force help promote serious attention at board and management levels to 
transition strategies?  What are the expectations by Canadian investors regarding disclosure of 
climate-relevant information, particularly given the framework of the FSB Task Force?  Finally, what 
liability risks are companies exposed to when they either misstate their opinions about the causes 
and consequences of climate change, or misstate or omit material facts about their businesses in 
light of climate change and the transition to a lower-carbon economy?  
                                                     
6 For example, see: 
 https://www.cdp.net/en-US/News/Pages/why-aiming-for-a.aspx; https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-
economy/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/id446948/; http://shareaction.org/become-
shareholder-activist   
7 For example, the UNEP Finance Initiative published its 10-year update to its seminal 'Freshfields Report' in September 
2015.  See UNEP, Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century (2015) (“21st Century Fiduciary”) , available at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciary_duty_21st_century.pdf.  And later in the same month Mark 
Carney (Governor of the Bank of England) gave a major speech on climate change and simultaneously the Bank of 
England Prudential Regulation Authority published a report on climate change impacts and the UK insurance sector, 
both of which cited litigation and liability as major potential concerns. See Governor Mark J. Carney, Breaking the 
tragedy of the horizon - climate change and financial stability, Sept. 29, 2015, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.aspx; Bank of England Prudential Regulatory 
Authority, The impact of climate change on the UK insurance sector: A Climate Change Adaptation Report by the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (Sept. 1, 2017), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/supervision/activities/pradefra0915.pdf. 
8 CDP is a non-governmental organization (NGO) that “request[s] information on climate risks and low carbon 
opportunities from the world’s largest companies on behalf of 827 institutional investor signatories with a combined 
US$100 trillion in assets.” See  https://www.cdp.net/en/climate (last visited August 6, 2017). 
9 The Task Force, chaired by Michael R. Bloomberg, was established by the FSB in December 2015 pursuant to a 
request from Bank of England Governor Mark Carney ‘to develop a set of voluntary disclosure recommendations for 
use by companies in providing information to investors, lenders and insurance underwriters about their climate-
related financial risks.” See https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/news/# (last visited August 6, 2017).  The Task Force 




These issues will be addressed as follows.  Part I discusses the proposed transition to a 
lower-carbon economy as Canada and the provinces implement the Pan-Canadian Framework, and 
sets out some of the more significant implications for companies and investors.  Part II describes 
the voluntary disclosure framework being suggested by the FSB’s Task Force on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures, and on-going efforts by Canadian securities regulators to evaluate that 
framework, among others, for potential incorporation into required disclosure.  Part III describes 
the current securities disclosure framework in Canada, with a particular emphasis on required 
disclosure of environmental information.  Part IV discusses the expectations of leading Canadian 
institutional investors for disclosure of climate-related financial information.  Part V evaluates the 
securities liability risks for Canadian issuers given three particularly trenchant disclosure issues: (1) 
a failure to discuss financially material “stranded assets”, given the transition to a lower-carbon 
economy; (2) misstatements or omissions of a company’s strategy for undertaking the transition 
to a lower-carbon economy; and (3) materially misstating the risks of continued extraction and use 
of a high-carbon product such as oil, gas, or coal.  Specific case studies illustrating each of these 
risks will be discussed.  Part VI concludes.    
 
 
I.  Transition to a Lower-Carbon Economy  
 
As with every developed economy, to transition to a low-carbon economy, Canada’s 
mechanisms for producing and using energy need to change.  The Pan-Canadian Framework 
estimates that 80% of Canada’s GHG emissions are caused by the production and use of energy: 
to power homes, offices, and industrial facilities; to fuel the transportation of people and goods; 
to build and heat homes and other types of facilities; to grow food, and transport that food; to fish, 
manage forests, cut trees, and generally to fuel the economy.10  But Canada faces a number of 
particularized challenges in its transition to a low-carbon economy.   It is a large, cold country, with 
people primarily clustered along its southern border, but also living at great distances to the North.  
These geographic aspects require extensive systems of transportation, and intensive amounts of 
energy for heating, including the use of carbon-intensive and polluting diesel generators in the 
North. Moreover, 14.4% of the Canadian economy is tied to the extraction, refining, transport and 
sale of oil, gas, coal, and mineral extraction.11  Transitioning away from these GHG-intensive 
sources of energy and economic inputs to the Canadian economy over the next decades will have 
effects on both producers and consumers; and could disproportionately affect particular provinces 
in Canada, notably Alberta, and particular people, such as those who work in the oil, gas, and coal 
industries.  Thus, as the governments have recognized, the transition needs to be carefully 
managed, to say the least. 
                                                     
10 See Pan-Canadian Framework, supra note 4, Forward. Ibid. at Forward.  Canada’s GHG emissions are coming from 
the following sources: 37% industry, the majority of which is coming from oil and gas production; 23% transportation; 
12% buildings; 11% electricity production; 10% agriculture; and 7% waste and other.  Ibid. at 8; oil and gas emissions 
constitute the majority of industrial emissions: ibid. at 16.  Electricity production is a small part of Canada’s overall GHG 
emissions because 80% of its electricity comes from low-emitting sources, presumably hydro and nuclear power.  Ibid.  
at 9.   





Yet, leadership on these and other challenges in the transition has already been at least 
articulated by provinces and the federal government.  Carbon pricing is a central aspect of that 
leadership.  As stated in the Pan-Canadian Framework report: 
 
“British Columbia has a carbon tax, Alberta has a hybrid system that combines a carbon 
levy with a performance-based system for large industrial emitters, and Québec and 
Ontario have cap-and-trade systems. With existing and planned provincial action, broad-
based carbon pricing will apply in provinces with nearly 85 per cent of Canada's economy 
and population by 2017, covering a large part of our emissions.”12  
 
The provinces, territories, and federal government have also recognized that carbon pricing may 
not do everything necessary to reduce GHG emissions by 30% from 2005 levels by 2030, the 
articulated federal goal, particularly (we would argue) if the price is set too low and does not rise 
fast enough to spur necessary innovations.  As a result, further steps that have been agreed include 
developing complementary regulatory actions concerning electricity production, transport, 
building standards, agriculture, and industry; taking actions on adaptation and building resilience 
to withstand extreme weather events; and the federal government providing funds for 
investments in innovation, clean technology, and new jobs.13  Some of the more significant 
regulatory commitments include phasing out the use of coal to produce electricity by 2030;14 
reducing methane and HFC emissions from the extraction of oil and gas by 40-45% by 2025 (as 
part of a multi-lateral treaty, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol);15 developing 
models for net-zero energy building codes by 2030;16  and establishing and updating vehicle 
emissions standards.17 
 
 These are ambitious policy targets, and implementation efforts to date have not been 
sufficient to meet Canada’s commitments, according to a recent report from the Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada, based on evaluations from the Auditor General in each province and 
territory.18  Here the main point is that the transition is already beginning, both as a matter of 
technology and policy developments, however, albeit without the scope and scale that is needed; 
and also that the physical changes of climate change are already underway, particularly seen in 
melting summer sea ice in the Artic and the drought and resulting extensive fires in Fort McMurray 
in 2016.  Each kind of transition that we currently see—physical, technological, and regulatory—is 
creating challenges for companies and investors that may lead to litigation and liability risk if not 
                                                     
12 See Pan-Canadian Framework, supra note 4, at 8. 
13 Ibid., Forward. 
14 Ibid., at 11. 
15 Ibid., at 16. 
16 Ibid., at 13. 
17 Ibid., at 15. 
18 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Perspectives on Climate Change Action in Canada—A Collaborative Report 
from Auditors General, March, 2018. As stated by the Auditor General of Canada, “On the basis of current federal, 
provincial, and territorial policies and actions, Canada is not expected to meet its 2020 target for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Meeting Canada’s 2030 target will require substantial effort and actions beyond those currently 
planned or in place. Most Canadian governments have not assessed and, therefore, do not fully understand what risks 
they face and what actions they should take to adapt to a changing climate.”  Ibid.  
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well evaluated and managed.   It is these latter risks that this White Paper, and the companion 
White Paper on Fiduciary Duty, seek to evaluate. 
 
 
II. Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) 
 
Over the last twenty-five years, voluntary disclosure of environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) information, and voluntary frameworks for that disclosure, have proliferated to meet the 
demands for information from investors, consumers, and civil society.  The most comprehensive 
source of data on ESG reporting of which these authors is aware is that done by KPMG in the 
Netherlands.  KPMG published its first ESG report in 1993, and its most recent in 2013.  In 1993, 
12% of the top 100 companies in the OECD countries (ex. Japan) published an environmental or 
social report.19   By 2013, 76% of the top 100 companies in the Americas publish a separate 
corporate responsibility report, as do 73% of top 100 companies in Europe and 71% in Asia.20  Of 
the largest 250 companies globally, reporting rates are 93%.21   The Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI)’s voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework for ESG reporting has emerged as the clear global 
benchmark: 78% of reporting companies worldwide and 82% of the Global 250 use GRI as the 
basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.22  Of particular note, slightly over half (59%) of 
the Global 250 now have their reports “assured,” most often (two-thirds of the time) by the 
specialist bureaus of the major accountancy firms.23  
 
As part of this trend of voluntary disclosure frameworks, the FSB’s Task Force on Climate 
Related Financial Disclosure (“TCFD”) is important for our discussion because it (a) is specific to 
climate-change risk, (b) is being developed by extremely influential, international participants in 
business and government; (c) has been endorsed by some of Canada’s largest pension funds;24 and 
(d) has been endorsed by hundreds of businesses around the world.25  Thus, we interpret the Task 
                                                     
19 See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENVIRONMENT & 
SUSTAINABLE DEVEL. 51, 52 Figure 1 (2004).  KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original 1993 report 
on corporate responsibility reporting, so direct comparisons are not possible between the Global 250 in 1993 and the 
Global 250 in 2013.  Ibid. 
20 KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, at 10,  available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-
responsibility/Documents/corporate-responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf.   
21 Ibid. 
22 See ibid. at 11. The Global Reporting Initiative is now in its fourth iteration. It has been developed by, and is used by, 
thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the economic, 
environmental, social and governance effects of entities’ actions.  See Global Reporting Initiative, available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org. 
23 See KPMG 2013 Report, supra note 20, at 11 
24 See Shawn McCarthy, Task force report puts ‘material risks’ of climate change in focus, Globe and Mail, June 29, 
2019, available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/task-force-report-puts-material-risks-of-
climate-change-in-focus/article35493217. According to this article, the Task Force standards have been endorsed by 
Ontario Teachers, Caisse de depot & placement du Quebec, and CPPIB.  We discuss these funds’ positions on climate 
disclosure below. 
25 See Emily Farnworth, Global CEOs call for greater disclosure of climate risks and opportunities, World Economic 
Forum, April 21, 2017, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/global-ceos-call-for-greater-disclosure-
of-climate-risks-and-opportunities/ (CEOs representing companies with $4.9 trillion in assets and $ 700 billion in 
revenue form Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders to advocate for adoption of TCFD Framework). 
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Force standards as a rapidly-emerging global best practice for climate disclosure, and will 
concentrate our discussion on it. 
 
 Founded in 2009 in reaction to the global financial crisis, the FSB is an international 
organization of central bank governors and financial regulators established by the Heads of State 
and Government of the Group of Twenty (G-20) as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum.26 
Its remit is to enhance the stability of global financial markets by monitoring and making 
recommendations regarding financial regulations and policies.27 The impetus for the FSB’s Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (“TCFD” or “Task Force”) was discussed in a speech 
delivered by Governor of the Bank of England and current Chair of the FSB Mark Carney in 
September 2015, entitled Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial 
stability. 
 
In his speech, Carney identified climate change as one of the greatest threats to the resilience 
and prosperity of global financial markets.28 It was during this speech that Carney first promoted 
the establishment of a climate disclosure task force to, among other things, assess the 
effectiveness of various environmental disclosure regimes, but more specifically to develop an 
authoritative, voluntary disclosure framework so that markets could allocate capital properly to 
promote the necessary transition to a low-carbon economy.29 In December 2015 the TCFD was 
established by the FSB, with Michael Bloomberg as its Chair, and with 32 global industry 
participants as members, including people from operating companies, banks, insurance 
companies, asset managers, and credit rating agencies.30 Canadians Jane Ambachtsheer (Mercer, 
now based in Paris) and Stephanie Leaist (Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB)) were 
part of the Task Force. 
 
The TCFD was created to develop voluntary climate-related disclosures that “could promote 
more informed investment, credit [or lending], and insurance underwriting decisions” which 
would, in turn, “enable stakeholders to understand better the concentrations of carbon-related 
assets in the financial sector and the financial system’s exposures to climate-related risks.”31 In 
keeping with its mandate, the TCFD released a scoping project on which it invited comments in 
April, 2016; a consultation draft of recommended climate-related financial disclosures in 
December, 2016; and then a Final Report setting out the TCFD’s recommendations on June 29, 
2017.32 Accompanying the Final Report, the TCFD published an Annex providing further specific 
                                                     
26 See: http://www.fsb.org/about/. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability” (Speech delivered at the 
Lloyd’s of London, 29 September 2015) [Bank of England] at 16. 
29 Ibid at 13-15. 
30 See Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, June 2017, at iii, available at 
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf (hereinafter “Task Force 
Report”). 
31 FSB, Proposal for a Disclosure Task Force on Climate-Related Risks (9 November 2015), online: <www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/Disclosure-task-force-on-climate-related-risks.pdf>. 
32 See Task Force Report, supra note 30, at iv. 
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guidance on how to report pursuant to its framework;33 and a Technical Supplement providing 
further detail on how to develop climate-related scenario analyses.34 
 
A.  Overview of Recommendations 
 
The TCFD identified four features of its  recommendations that it considered “key features”: 
(1) that they could be adopted by all organizations, including financial institutions and investors as 
well as operating companies; (2) that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in 
required financial filings; (3) that the disclosure be decision-relevant, forward-looking information; 
and (4) that there should be a strong focus on risks and opportunities from the transition to a 
lower-carbon economy.35 It also emphasized as a “key recommendation” the importance of using 
and disclosing the results of scenario analysis to determine the resilience of the organization and 
its strategies under different climate change and adaptation scenarios,36 issuing a Technical 
Supplement to guide issuers and financial institutions in preparing scenario disclosure.37 
 
 The Final Report identifies four areas for climate-related disclosure that represent the core 
elements of how organizations operate: Governance, Strategy, Risk Management, and Metrics & 
Targets.38  It conceptualized these recommendations follows:  
 
                                                     
33 See Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, Annex: Implementing the Recommendations of the TCFD, 
June 2017, available at: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-implementing-tcfd-recommendations/ 
(hereinafter Annex). 
34 See Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, Technical Supplement: The Use of Scenario Analysis in 
Disclosure of Climate-Related Risks and Opportunities, June 2017, available at https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Technical-Supplement-062917.pdf (hereinafter Technical Supplement).   
35 See Task Force Report, supra note 30, at iii. 
36 See ibid., at v. 
37 See Technical Supplement, supra note 34. 
38 See Task Force Report, supra note 30, at v. 
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Credit: Task Force Report, at v. 
 
What is notable about the TCFD’s disclosure categories is that they do not call on issuers to 
make speculative determinations about how large-scale, systemic disruptions such as climate 
change might affect their business at a far future date.  Rather, they call upon individual companies 
to discuss how that company is approaching the identification, management, and quantification of 
climate change risks and opportunities today, and what strategic risks and opportunities the 
company perceives from the transition to a low-carbon economy.  In other words, what are 
companies’ managements doing now to respond to the challenges of the Paris Agreement and 
their country’s Nationally Determined Contributions to meet the ambitions of that agreement?  
Far from requiring speculative or boiler-plate disclosure, then, the TCFD has focused on specific 
information that managers can provide (how are they evaluating and managing these risks to their 
company in their industry and geographic regions), and specific information that investors can use 
to direct their capital to companies with smart, proactive management.  
 
B.   Implementing the TCFD’s Disclosure Framework 
 
In the accompanying Annex, the Task Force provides further details on its recommended 
disclosures, using a structure comparable to other voluntary disclosure initiatives (e.g., GRI; CDP’s 
climate surveys; Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)): disclosure guidance for all 
sectors, including financial institutions; and then sector-specific disclosures.  For all sectors, specific 
disclosures are identified relating to each of the four thematic areas (governance, strategy, risk 
management, and metrics and targets).39 For all sectors, there is no materiality screen for  
disclosures related to governance and risk management, but for strategy, metrics and targets 
materiality judgments are still relevant.40 Thus, some of the difficulties that the concept of 
materiality presents will still need to be addressed, particularly how company by company 
                                                     
39 See Annex, supra note 33, at 14-20.  
40 See Annex, supra note 33, at 3. 
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materiality determinations should be evaluated in light of systemic risks where each company’s 
contribution to the problem matters, but may not be independently “material.”  For asset 
managers and asset managers, the “Task Force recommends including carbon footprinting 
information in reports to clients and beneficiaries independent of a materiality assessment.”41 
 
    Sector-specific disclosures are identified for financial institutions (banks, insurance 
companies, asset managers and asset owners (investors); and then for sectors particularly 
vulnerable to material financial implications from the physical effects of climate change and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.  The Task Force identifies those sectors as energy; 
transportation; materials and buildings; agriculture, food and forestry.42  Again, sector-specific, 
detailed guidance is provided for disclosure across the four thematic areas of governance, strategy, 
risk management, and metrics and targets. 
 
  It is clear from the Task Force analysis that few significant sectors are understood not to be 
particularly vulnerable to climate change effects and transition efforts.  That analysis is consistent 
with the conclusion of the U.S. based Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) that 72 of 
79 industries, representing 93% of capital market valuations, are vulnerable to material financial 
implications from climate change, although the implications are obviously different for different 
sectors.43   
 
C.   Scenario Analyses 
  
One of the key Task Force recommendations asks issuers to describe the likely impacts on the 
organization’s “businesses, strategy, and financial planning” of various climate change scenarios.44   
Scenario analysis seeks to develop ideas about how “a business might perform under different 
future states,” that is how resilient the business is to the stress of climate change and associated 
regulatory developments, and how robust management strategies are to uncertain medium- to 
long-term developments.45  A number of companies particularly exposed to climate change risk 
have used the technique in recent years, including Glencore, BHP Billiton, Statoil, and 
ConocoPhillips.46 
 
To be useful, the Task Force recognized that the scenarios in any scenario analysis should be:   
  
“1. Plausible. The events in the scenario should be possible and the narrative credible 
(i.e., the descriptions of what happened, and why and how it happened, should be believable).  
2. Distinctive. Each scenario should focus on a different combination of the key 
factors. Scenarios should be clearly differentiated in structure and in message, not variations 
                                                     
41 Ibid. 
42 See ibid., at 46. 
43 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Climate Risk—Technical Bulletin, SASB Library 2017, available at 
https://library.sasb.org/climate-risk-technical-bulletin/.   
44 See Final Report, supra note 30, at 21, and Technical Supplement, supra note 34, passim. 
45  See Technical Supplement, supra note 34, at 2. 
46 See ibid. at 3. 
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on a single theme. Multiple scenarios should be used to explore how different permutations 
and/or temporal developments of the same key factors can yield very different outcomes.  
3. Consistent. Each scenario should have strong internal logic. The goal of scenario 
analysis is to explore the way that factors interact, and each action should have a reaction. 
Neither actors nor external factors should completely overturn the evidence of current trends 
and positions unless logical explanations for those changes are a central part of the scenario.  
4. Relevant. Each scenario, and the set of scenarios taken as a whole, should 
contribute specific insights into the future that relate to strategic and/or financial implications 
of climate-related risks and opportunities.”  
5. Challenging. Scenarios should challenge conventional wisdom and simplistic 
assumptions about the future. When thinking about the major sources of uncertainty, 
scenarios should try to explore alternatives that will significantly alter the basis for business-
as-usual assumptions.” 47  
 
The Task Force recognized that any number of potential scenarios could be used to evaluate 
climate change risks and opportunities, and that using a range of scenarios improves the usefulness 
of the technique.48  The Task Force is recommending using “at a minimum, a 2°C scenario,” and 
that companies should “consider using other scenarios most relevant to the organization’s 
circumstances, such as scenarios related to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), business-
as-usual (greater than 2°C) scenarios, physical climate risk scenarios, or other challenging 
scenarios.”49  Ultimately, issuers should describe how they plan to mitigate climate-related risks 
and capitalize on the opportunities revealed by their chosen climate change scenario(s).   
 
D. Conclusion: The TFCD Recommendations  
 
The Task Force’s recommendations are widely viewed as the foundation for improved 
reporting of climate-related issues in mainstream financial filings. The recommendations are 
ambitious yet practical. The TFCD believes that the reporting of climate-related risks and 
opportunities will evolve over time as organizations, investors, and others contribute to the quality 
and consistency of the information disclosed.  
 
Canadian securities regulators have recently committed to reviewing their climate disclosure 
requirements, including by evaluating such requirements in a number of jurisdictions—Australia, 
the U.K. and the U.S.—as well as reviewing a number of voluntary disclosure standards, including 
the TCFD’s disclosure standards.50  This review is a promising step forward.  As we argue below, 
there is good reason for the CSA to propose a more robust climate change disclosure regime 
modelled after the TCFD recommendations. Given the innovative and highly detailed climate-
related disclosures promulgated by the TCFD, and its attention to management strategy, board 
governance, specific targets and metrics, the CSA would be well-advised to choose to incorporate 
the TCFD’s recommendations into the Canadian securities regulatory regime. 
                                                     
47 See ibid. at 2. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., at 3. 
50 See Canadian Securities Regulators Announce Climate Change Disclosure Review Project, March 21, 2017, available 





III. Current Disclosure Requirements in Canada 
 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the structure of Canadian securities regulation, 
and the current regulations that can be interpreted to require climate-related financial 
disclosures.  The discussion will show that there is a lack of specificity in the requirements, which 
are principles-based; that there are no clear requirements to provide investment-relevant 
information on the management, strategy, risks and opportunities of climate change and its 
mitigation, although general materiality guidance could be interpreted to require such disclosure; 
and thus that there is significant room for regulations to be updated to improve companies’ 
disclosure on this economically-material matter.   
 
A.  Overview of Canadian Securities Regulation and the Exchanges 
 
1.  Canadian Securities Regulation 
 
Securities regulation in Canada is divided amongst the 13 provinces and territories, each with 
their own respective securities laws and regulator.51 In general, all provincial and territorial 
securities laws serve the purpose of creating fair and efficient capital markets. Despite this unity in 
purpose, each province and territory operates as a “closed system”, with their respective 
regulators qualifying distributions of securities according to their statutes.52 For example, if an 
issuer wishes to distribute its securities in the province of Ontario, it must comply with the Ontario 
Securities Act. As a result, when an issuer is registered in one province and seeks to distribute its 
securities in another province, it is faced with the regulatory burden of having to comply with 
another set of laws.  
 
The regulators (“Commissions”) have attempted to alleviate this burden by establishing an 
organization, the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”), to coordinate amongst most of the 
provinces, and to harmonize regulations across the Canadian capital markets.53 In 2008, the CSA 
created a “passport system” allowing market participants in all provinces, except Ontario, to 
participate “in all passport jurisdictions by dealing only with its principal regulator and complying 
with one set of harmonized laws”.54 On September 8, 2014, after efforts to directly establish a 
national regulator were frustrated,55 British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, 
                                                     
51 The statutory provisions applicable to a number of important provincial markets include the Ontario Securities Act, 
RSO 1990, c S5 [OSA]; Alberta Securities Act, SA 2000, c S4 [ASA]; British Columbia Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418 
[BCSA]; Nova Scotia Securities Act, RSNS 1989, c 418 [NSSA].   
52 Mary Condon, Anita Anand, Janis Sarra and Sarah Bradley, Securities Law in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2017) at 176. 
53 See online: https://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=77.  
54 Ibid. See also Multilateral Instrument 11-102 Passport System. 
55 The prospect of establishing a national regulator has been difficult, given judicial interpretations of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c-3 (Constitution Act) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms [part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982] (Charter).  As per section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial governments have exclusive power to 
regulate property and civil rights, while section 91(2) established the Canadian federal government’s power to regulate 
trade and commerce. Unfortunately, with respect to the securities markets, the provinces’ power to regulate property 
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Prince Edward Island, and the Yukon (Participating Jurisdictions) signed the first draft of the 
Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System. The 
signatories of this memorandum have made a “strong commitment... to implement a cooperative 
capital markets regulatory system”, particularly through the creation of a “single operationally 
independent capital markets regulatory authority (the ‘CMRA’)”.56 According to the Participating 
Jurisdictions, the CMRA would foster more globally competitive Canadian capital markets, 
encourage market innovation, bolster investor protection by creating consistent regulatory 
standards, better coordinate enforcement activities, and enhance Canada’s ability to manage 
systemic risks.57  
 
The most important feature of the current decentralized system is the potential for the CSA 
to issue National Instruments (NI), which are agreed to by all regulators and thus intended to create 
uniform standards across the country. Since the CSA does not have regulatory authority, the 
provisions of National Instruments need to be “implemented by rule or policy in each participating 
province.”58 A number of National Instruments will be discussed below, including important 
instruments defining “material facts,” creating requirements for what information is to be included 
in issuers’ continuous disclosure for secondary market trading, and establishing parameters for the 
disclosure of environmental information.  
 
2.  The Exchanges 
 
Of the provinces and territories, Ontario has the largest securities exchange in Canada, the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), owned by the TMX Group, which also owns the TSX Venture 
Exchange (TSXV), headquartered in Calgary, Alberta.  A report published by the Market Intelligence 
Group in March 2017 pegged the TSX and TSXV total collective market cap in excess of CAD 2.2 
trillion, with the majority of their listed companies headquartered in Ontario.59 Ontario is also the 
home of the largest securities regulator in Canada, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), with 
more than 560 employees.60  
 
Given the context of this research, it is important to recognize that the majority of TSXV 
issuers have resource dependant business models, as do a significant minority of TSX issuers.  As 
of March 2017, the Market Intelligence Group reported that Mining was the most dominant sector 
on these exchanges, comprising 60% of all TSXV and 16% of TSX listed issuers (second only to 
                                                     
and civil rights has consistently been interpreted to be in conflict with the federal government’s power to regulate 
trade and commerce. In short, this division of powers has been a significant obstacle to the creation of a national 
securities regulator. See Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837, holding that the proposed federal 
Securities Act, which would have established a federal securities regulator, was outside of Parliament’s power and an 
infringement of the provinces’ power to regulate property.   
56 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding The Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System at 1-3. 
57 See Condon et al., supra note 52, at 1. 
58 See ibid, at 25. 




Exchange Traded Funds, which account for 31% of TSX listed issuers).61 It is also worth noting that 
Oil & Gas is Alberta’s most dominant sector (Canada’s second largest capital market, responsible 
for 21% of Canada’s capital markets activity), representing 49% of Alberta’s  industrial output.62  
 
The dominance of the natural resource sectors in Canadian capital markets, and economy as 
a whole, underscores the challenges facing Canada in the transition to a low-carbon economy.  The 
importance of these sectors also underscores the need for clear, comparable disclosure of how 
companies are managing the strategic risks of that transition.  As will be discussed below, current 
regulations are not leading to issuers generally producing clear, comparable disclosure about their 
transition risks and strategies.  
 
B.   Environmental Disclosure in Canada: Staff Notice 51-533 
 
As stated above, the requirements set out in provincial securities legislation are the primary 
source of disclosure obligations in Canada, but they are reinforced by nationally harmonized 
standards.63 General disclosure obligations are primarily provided by NI 41-101 General Prospectus 
Standards (NI 41-101) for primary market transactions, and NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure 
Obligations (NI 51-102), for secondary market transactions and continuing disclosure.64  According 
to those instruments, issuers’ disclosures must generally provide “full, true, and plain disclosure of 
all material facts”; issuers must also notify security holders of any material changes to their 
business and operations.65 
 
Three changes in the market motivated the CSA in 2010 to issue specific guidance on 
environmental reporting in Staff Notice 51-533: “increasing impacts on issuers of environmental 
matters; the changing environmental regulatory landscape; and increasing investor interest in 
environmental matters.”66  A staff notice is a less formal communication from the CSA, often, as 
here, to provide guidance on “emerging regulatory problems that have not yet become the subject 
of a policy or a rule.”67  Staff Notice 51-533 was published in an effort to “assist issuers in assessing 
which information must be disclosed on material environmental matters, such as risks related to 
                                                     
61 The MiG Report, supra note 59. The second most prominent sector listed on the TSXV is Oil & Gas at 9% and the fifth 
most prominent sector on the TSX at 5% (subordinate only to the financial sectors and the broad sector referred to as 
Diversified Industries). 
62 ASC Annual Report 2016, ASC, at 10 and 13, online at: http://www.albertasecurities.com/Publications/2016-Annual-
Report.pdf.  
63 See, for instance, Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5 [OSA]; Alberta Securities Act, SA 2000, c S4 [ASA]; British 
Columbia Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418 [BCSA]; Nova Scotia Securities Act, RSNS 1989, c 418 [NSSA]. 
64 General Prospectus Standards, NI 41-101; Continuous Disclosure Obligations, NI 51-102, both agreed within the 
auspices of the Canadian Securities Administrators and then promulgated in each province and territory. 
65 See, e.g., Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2007] 3. S.C.R. 331, 2007 S.C.C. 44, interpreting Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 
1990, §57(1), definition of material change. 
66 Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-333, Environmental Reporting Guidance, October 27, 2010, 
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-
reporting.pdf.  
67 Condon et al, supra note 52, at 29. 
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weather patterns or environmental legislation”.68 In specific, CSA Notice 51-333 was drafted to 
provide guidance on definitions and principles concerning the following areas of disclosure:69 
 
• Material Information (that is, the materiality of environmental information); 
• Environmental risks and related matters; 
• Environmental risk oversight and management; 
• Forward-looking information requirements as they relate to environmental goals and 
targets;   
• Impact of adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on disclosure of 
environmental liabilities.70 
 
It is also important to point out that Canadian environmental disclosure requirements are 
part of disclosure obligations generally, as established in NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure 
Obligations.  In other words, environmental disclosure obligations are not housed in a distinct 
instrument or piece of legislation, but rather, are an application of the general disclosure 
obligations of NI 51-102.   Staff Notice NI 51-333 states that environmental matters comprise a 
“broad range of issues, including air, land, water and waste”, which can affect issuers in several 
ways, “including interrupting operations, resulting in material unplanned costs, providing new 
business opportunities, and potentially affecting reputation, capital expenditures, and a license to 
operate”.71 Bearing in mind the source and scope of environmental disclosure in Canada, what 
follows is an overview of the purpose of Staff Notice 51-333 and the guidance it sets out for issuers.   
 
1. Purpose of Staff Notice 51-333 
 
As stated by the CSA, the purpose of Notice 51-333 “is to provide guidance to reporting 
issuers (other than investment funds) on existing continuous disclosure requirements relating to 
environmental matters under securities legislation”.72  As stated by the CSA, the Notice is intended 
to assist issuers with: (1) determining what information about environmental matters needs to be 
disclosed, and (2) enhancing or supplementing their disclosure regarding environmental matters, 
as necessary.73  
 
2. Materiality of Environmental Information 
 
The determining factor in considering whether information should be disclosed under 
securities disclosure laws generally is materiality. The test for materiality is objective: “information 
relating to environmental matters is likely material if a reasonable investor’s decision whether or 
not to buy, sell or hold securities of the issuer would likely be influenced or changed if the 
                                                     
68 News Release: Canadian Securities Regulators Publish Additional Guidance on Environmental Disclosure, CSA (27 
October 2010), online: http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=928.  
69  Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 6. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 3.     




information was omitted or misstated”.74 Where the information is deemed to be material, it must 
be disclosed. In order to assist issuers with determinations of the materiality of environmental 
information, the Notice set out several guiding principles for determining the materiality of 
information generally. 
 
One caveat to note here is that CSA Staff Notice 51-333 states that it reviewed many 
“discussions of materiality in the environmental context” in arriving at its guiding principles for 
determining the materiality of environmental information, including reviewing five specific 
documents on climate change disclosure.75  Notwithstanding, there is nothing specific to climate 
change disclosure in its discussion of material information, nor in its Staff Notice generally, 
although there are a number of examples of climate change related disclosures set out in the 
Appendix.  Certainly there is no guidance on climate change related financial disclosure of the kind 
now provided by the TCFD Final Report and supplemental materials. 
 
 The first guiding principle provided by the CSA is that there is no-bright line test for 
materiality.76 In order to make it clear that there is no quantitate threshold for materiality, the CSA 
states that issuers should consider both qualitative and quantitative environmental factors when 
deciding whether environmental matters are material and require disclosure.77 As such, materiality 
is a flexible concept that varies between issuers and industries according to the circumstance.78 In 
other words, an event that may warrant disclosure by one issuer, such as perhaps a small issuer,  
may not be material to another, larger issuer. 
 
 The second guiding principle is that determinations of materiality depend on the context.79 
Though certain facts and events may not be material on their own, they may be material if 
considered “in light of all the facts available”.80 Conversely, some facts and events are material on 
their own. In any case, issuers should not assess the materiality of individual facts, but rather 
holistically consider the total mix of facts.81  
                                                     
74 Ibid at 5. See also Part 1(f) of Form 51-102F1 and Part 1(e) of Form 51-102F2. 
75 Documents CSA stated that it reviewed included: “ • the CICA publication, Executive Briefing – Climate Change and 
Related Disclosures (March 2008) • the CICA publication, Building A Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures 
(November 2008) • the CICA publication, Climate Change Briefing (July 2009) • the CICA publication, Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) Issues in Institutional Investor Decision Making (August 2010) • the May 2009 exposure 
draft of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board Reporting Framework, and • the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s guidance, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (effective February 2, 
2010).”   Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 6.  
76 See Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 7. 
77 Ibid. See also s National Policy 51-201 – Disclosure Standards, OSC NP 51-102, (2002) 25 OSCB 4492, (12 July 2002), s 
4.2 [NP 51-201]; OSC Staff Notice 51-716 Environmental Reporting, OSC Staff Notice 51-716, (2008) 31 OSCB 2223, 
(February 29, 2008) [OSC Notice 51-716]; Form 41-101F1 Information Required in a Prospectus, General Instruction 3. 
According to the University of Northern British Columbia, gathering both qualitative data and quantitative data are 
essential to the practice of environmental monitoring. Quantitative data is both “physical and measurable”, such as PH 
levels in a body of water. Conversely, qualitative data is both “a non-physical or observable source of data”, such as a 
“stream’s colour or cleanliness”. For more information, visit: http://online.unbc.ca/index.php/quantitative-vs-
qualitative-data/.  
78  See Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 7. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 




The next two guiding principles are closely related with an issuer’s projected lifecycle.  The 
third guiding principle, being the timing of disclosures, is driven by the circumstances of the 
issuer.82 For instance, an issuer that is expected to have a long investment cycle, or develop and 
implement new technologies throughout its projected investment cycle, may be more susceptible 
to the impacts of gradual environmental change.83 As such, an issuer should consider whether the 
impact of an environmental matter “might reasonably be expected to grow over time, in which 
case the matter may be considered material and warrant early disclosure on the basis that it might 
be important to reasonable investors”.84 Similarly, issuers should also understand how their 
business will intersect with known trends, demands, commitments, events and uncertainties. 
Accordingly, the next principle states that, when an issuer’s affairs are (or will be) affected by a 
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, such information should be disclosed.85 Issuers 
should consider their operational time horizon and assess the probability and the magnitude of 
the effects imposed by a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty – such that 
environmental matters that are likely to come to fruition within the projected investment cycle of 
an issuer and materially affect its business and operations are disclosed.86  
 
The last principle articulates the CSA’s general pro-disclosure approach.  As it states, “if there 
is any doubt about whether particular information is material”, the CSA “encourages issuers to err 
on the side of materiality and disclose the information”.87 
 
3. Environmental Risk Disclosure 
 
According to Notice 51-333, there are five key disclosure requirements relating to environmental 
matters that arise from NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations. These categories of 
disclosure include: (i) environmental risks, (ii) trends and uncertainties, (iii) environmental 
liabilities, (iv) asset retirement obligations, and the (v) financial and operational effects of 
environmental protection requirements. 
 
 
i. Environmental Risks   
 
As per Item 5.2 of Form 51-102F2 Annual Information Form, relevant environmental risks 
should be considered when deciding what information needs to be disclosed.88 “Generally, risks 
that may impact an issuer’s business and operations can be divided into five categories: litigation, 
                                                     
82 See Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 7 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. The CSA recognized that this guiding principle was “derived from sources such as the CICA publication, Building 
A Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures (November 2008) and the May 2009 exposure draft of the Climate 
Disclosure Standards Board Reporting Framework.”  Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid. at 8.  See also National Policy 51-201 – Disclosure Standards, OSC NP 51-102, (2002) 25 OSCB 4492, (12 July 
2002), s 4.2(2) [NP 51-201]. 
88 See Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 66, at 8, discussing Item 5.2 of Form 51-102F2. 
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physical, regulatory, reputation and the business model.”89 Each of these environmental risks must 
be evaluated with a view not only to the present, but to the future as well. They are discussed in 
turn in Staff Notice 51-333. 
 
 First, issuers should disclose current, impending, or likely environmental litigation matters; as 
part of litigation disclosure, the issuer should disclose its anticipated exposures and the likelihood 
of success. 90 Second, an issuer should disclose how it is likely to be affected by the physical risks 
imposed by environmental matters; environmental matters refers to both distinct, human-
initiated environmental events, such as toxic dumping, or naturally occurring events, such as 
flooding due to rising water levels.91 Furthermore, physical risks disclosure includes information 
about the issuer’s “risk management, adaptation and mitigation strategies”, both in place and 
those that it plans to adopt in the future, and the associated costs.92 Third, issuers should disclose 
their regulatory risks.93   In particular, an issuer should disclose the ways in which it expects to be 
affected by both “current and likely environmental regulations”; boilerplate disclosure should not 
be used.94 Fourth, issuers should disclose any risks relating to its business model, which includes 
information regarding “legal, technological, political and scientific developments regarding 
environmental matters” that have created (or will likely create) “new material opportunities or 
risks” for the issuer.95 The fifth and final risk is reputational risk.96  As the Staff Notice states, how 
an issuer addresses environmental matters may damage “brand value, consumer confidence, 
employee loyalty, ability to attract financial capital and obtaining regulatory approval of 
projects”.97 As such, an issuer should disclose how its interactions with local, national and 
international environmental matters would affect (or likely affect) its reputation and, thus, its 
business or operations. 98 
 
                                                     
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid at 9. 
91 Ibid. According to the Notice, some potential environmental impacts that would warrant disclosure are: “property 
damage; health and safety issues for employees and to members of the public; disruptions to operations, including 
manufacturing operations or the transport of manufactured products; disruptions to operations of major customers or 
suppliers; increased insurance claims and liabilities for insurance and reinsurance issuers, and; increased insurance 
premiums and deductibles, or a decrease in the availability or loss of coverage.”  Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid at 9-10. Some examples of issuer specific considerations that should be included in regulatory risk disclosure 
are: “disclosure of applicable and anticipated regulatory requirements, disclosure as to whether or not the issuer will 
be in material compliance with such requirements, the costs of compliance, and any assumptions or facts used where 
the quantification of a regulatory risk is uncertain.” Ibid.  
95 Ibid at 10. As stated by the CSA in the Staff Notice, possible indirect risks and opportunities may include: “changes to 
production practices; changes due to emerging technologies; decreased demand for goods that have a negative 
impact on the environment or fail to meet customer standards; increased demand for goods that have less of an 
impact on the environment than competing products; changes to tax incentives and subsidies; increased competition 
to develop innovative products; increased demand for generation and transmission of energy from alternative energy 
sources, and; decreased demand for services related to carbon-based energy sources, such as drilling services or 
equipment maintenance services.” Ibid. 





Once an issuer has evaluated its environmental risks, and determined that disclosure is 
required, it must incorporate that disclosure in the Annual Information Form (AIF).99 The issuer’s 
AIF should explain how these risks might affect its business and operations.  
 
ii.  Trends and Uncertainties 
 
Management’s Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) is an important part of an issuer’s continuous 
disclosure, and should, as part of discussing an issuer’s financial statements and operational 
results, provide management’s narrative explanation regarding the potential and actualized 
material impacts of environmental trends and uncertainties.100  According to established standards 
of materiality, “there is no specified future time period that must be considered in assessing the 
impact of a known trend or uncertainty that is reasonably likely to occur”.101 Rather, the issuer 
must identify all trends and uncertainties that a reasonably likely to have a material impact on its 
business and operation throughout its projected lifecycle. As specified in the Notice, an issuer 
should disclose: “(1) what has been, and is reasonably likely to be, the impact of environmental 
trends or uncertainties on revenues, expenditures and cash flows; and (2) the impact 
environmental trends or uncertainties have on its financial condition and liquidity, if any”.102 In 
summary, issuers should, at a minimum, disclose how trends and uncertainties will (or may 
potentially) materially impact its revenues and expenses.103 
 
iii. Environmental Liabilities 
 
Environmental liabilities arise when an issuer’s operations have, will, or may negatively impact 
the environment. The most common example would be liabilities arising from past, ongoing, or 
potentially future legal obligations to make expenditures “due to the manufacture, use, release or 
                                                     
99 Ibid at 8. For a full description of the required contents in an AIF, refer to Form 51-102F2 Annual Information Form. 
100 Ibid. at 10-11. See also Form 51-102F1 Management’s Discussion & Analysis, Part 1(a) and Item 1.4(g). 
101 Ibid at 11. 
102 Ibid at 10-11. In particular, an issuer’s MD&A should, among other things, “discuss: (i) material information that 
may not be fully reflected in the financial statements, such as contingent liabilities or other contractual obligations, 
and (ii) important trends and risks that have affected the financial statements, and trends and risks that are reasonably 
likely to affect them in the future.”  Ibid.  Furthermore, “Item 1.4(g) of Form 51-102F1 requires the RI to discuss its 
analysis of its operations for the most recently completed financial year, including commitments, events, risks or 
uncertainties that it reasonably believes will materially affect the issuer’s future performance.” Ibid. at 11.  
103 Ibid. As per the Notice, environmental impacts on revenues include: “changes in consumer preference or demand 
for goods and services due, in whole or in part, to environmental matters or trends; changes in supply chain 
requirements related to environmental matters; new rules requiring design changes to products; the sale of, or 
royalties on, innovative technologies; delayed or denied regulatory environmental approvals; the availability and price 
of emissions credits or offsets.” Ibid.  Environmental impacts on expenses include: “the need to retrofit existing 
facilities to address physical, health and safety, or regulatory constraints; research and development activities related 
to more environmentally efficient operations and processes; purchase and implementation of new information 
systems to measure and record natural resource impacts (including, for example, greenhouse gas emissions and water 
and energy usage); increased or new insurance coverage or premiums; purchases of allowances or offsets to meet 
regulatory emissions requirements; penalties for failure to meet government-mandated reduction targets; repairing or 
rebuilding facilities impacted by adverse weather events; investments in productive capacity that embody new ‘green’ 
or more energy efficient technologies; investments in projects to generate offsets; financing costs related to 
expenditures.” Ibid.  at 12.  
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threatened release of a particular substance”.104 A potential environmental liability and the 
corresponding legal obligations are typically contingent on some form of law, regulation, or policy 
that is not yet in force.105  
 
Once identified, environmental liabilities are either disclosed directly in an issuer’s financial 
statements106 or indirectly through MD&A.107 That said, the CSA Staff is “of the view that in order 
for a TSX-listed issuer to meet the requirements of item 1.12 of Form 51-102F1, the issuer should 
quantify the accounting estimate [for an environmental liability] where quantitative information is 
reasonably available and would provide material information to investors.”108 Finally, the CSA is of 
the view that “a discussion of material potential environmental liabilities” should be included in 
issuers’ continuous disclosure documents, regardless of whether the liability “has been accrued in 
the financial statements or has been disclosed in the notes to the financial statements”, thereby 
allowing investors to better assess the nature and scope of potential liabilities, and their 
“probability of occurring.”109 
 
iv. Asset Retirement Obligations  
 
According to the Notice, “assets are considered retired if they are sold, abandoned, recycled 
or disposed of,” but this definition does not include assets that are “temporarily removed from 
service.”110 When an asset is retired, issuers may be required to meet certain legal obligations “to 
perform certain procedures, rather than a promise to pay cash,” otherwise known as an asset 
retirement obligation (ARO).111 The CSA expects issuers to disclose material AROs in their MD&A, 
in addition to including them in required financial disclosure.112 When reasonably available, 
information regarding material environmental remediation costs should also be disclosed.113 In 
summary, an issuer’s MD&A should include “a comprehensive discussion of commitments, events 
or uncertainties, including AROs that are reasonably likely to have an effect on the issuer’s 
                                                     
104 Ibid at 12. As the Notice states, environmental liabilities include: “compliance obligations related to laws and 
regulations or other binding requirements that apply to the manufacture, use, disposal and release of substances, and 
other activities that may adversely affect the environment; existing and future site remediation obligations; obligations 
to pay civil, administrative and criminal fines and penalties for statutory or regulatory noncompliance; obligations to 
compensate private parties for personal injury, property damage and economic loss; obligations to pay punitive or 
special damages, or make or maintain specific reserves for those damages; obligations to pay for natural resource 
damages.” Ibid. at 13.  
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid., citing Form 51-102F1, Item 1.12. 
107 Ibid., citing Form 51-102F1, Part 1(a). 
108 Ibid. According to the Notice, “[w]here measurement of an environmental liability involves a critical accounting 
estimate (as defined in Form 51-102F1), certain disclosure is required. Specifically, item 1.12 of Form 51-102F1 
requires management of TSX-listed issuers to include an analysis of critical accounting estimates in their MD&A.” Ibid.  
109 Ibid. at 14. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid. These legal obligations include: “government actions, such as laws or regulations; written or oral agreements 
between entities, and; a promise to a third party that imposes a reasonable expectation of performance.” Ibid. 
112 Ibid. See also Item 1.2 and 1.6 of Form 51-102F1. 
113 Ibid. As stated in the Notice, disclosure of environmental remediation costs includes “a discussion of the costs 
associated with: the disposal of hazardous materials, and; the costs associated with the implementation of reclamation 
technologies.”  Ibid.at 15.  
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business”.114 As AROs are generally incurred over more than one reporting period, the Notice also 
provides that “information should be provided for all periods that may be materially impacted”.115 
 
v. Financial and Operational Effects of Environmental Protection Requirements 
 
As stated in the Notice, item 5.1(1)(k) of Form 51-102F2 requires issuers to disclose the 
“financial and operational effects of environmental protection requirements on the issuer’s capital 
expenditures, earnings and competitive position in the current financial year and the expected 
effect in future years”.116 When discussing environmental protection requirements, issuers should 
disclose material costs where the information is reasonably available, any foreseeable changes to 
such costs, and the potential operational and financial impact of such costs.117 
 
4. Environmental Risk Oversight and Management 
 
Of particular relevance to this analysis, the Notice recognizes that “[i]nvestors have indicated 
that they would like information to assess whether directors are appropriately focusing on risk 
management, including environmental risk management.”118 In particular, the Notice states that 
there two “key sets of disclosure requirements” that “provide insight into an issuer’s oversight and 
management of environmental risks: (i) environmental policies implemented by the issuer and (ii) 
board governance.”119 
 
i. Issuer’s Environmental Policies   
 
According to the Notice, the term “policy” should be construed broadly to include policies for 
“sustainable development, community relations, the use and disposal of toxic or otherwise 
hazardous materials, prevention of spills, recycling, conservation of water and the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions”.120 Item 5.1(4) of Form 51-102F2 Annual Information Form requires  
issuers to describe any material environmental policies it has implemented or plans to implement, 
to explain the purpose of these policies, and to disclose the steps and costs associated with 
implementation (where quantitative information is reasonably available).121  
 
ii. Board Governance 
 
Staff Notice 51-333 points out that pursuant to section 3.4 of National Policy 58-201 Corporate 
Governance Guidelines, “the board should adopt a written mandate in which it explicitly 
acknowledges responsibility for, among other things: (1) adopting a strategic planning process and 
approving, on at least an annual basis, a strategic plan which takes into account, among other 
                                                     
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid at 14-15. 
116 Ibid at 15. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid.at 16. 





things, the opportunities and risks of the business, and (2) identifying the principal risks of the 
issuer’s business and ensuring the implementation of appropriate systems to manage those 
risks”.122  
 
A particularly important component of Board Governance disclosures is the description of the 
issuer’s Board Committees.  In particular, these disclosures should describe how an issuer’s board, 
standing committees, and management-level personnel oversee and manage environmental risks, 
if applicable.123 In order to avoid boilerplate language, the Notice states that governance 
disclosures should provide insight into: “the development and periodic review of the issuer’s risk 
profile; the integration of risk oversight and management into the issuer’s strategic plan; the 
identification of significant elements of risk management, including policies and procedures to 
manage risk; and the board’s assessment of the effectiveness of risk management policies and 
procedures, where applicable”.124 
 
5. International Financial Reporting Standards  
 
Financial reporting under IFRS is fundamentally different than reports provided using 
Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  As the Staff Notice points out, IFRS 
may require issuers to “accrue more environmental liabilities, at higher amounts, and provide 
more disclosure regarding these liabilities”.125  
 
6. Forward-looking Information Requirements 
 
If an issuer discloses an environmental target or goal in any form, and such information is 
deemed to be material, the document containing the target or goal must comply with the forward-
looking information requirements in Part 4A of NI 51-102.126 Furthermore, the Notice states 
documents containing targets or goals that constitute future oriented financial information or a 
financial outlook must comply with specific requirements in Part 4B of NI 51-102.127 
 
C.  Subsequent Developments 
 
Since the release of Notice 51-333, regulators have continued to refine and update 
environmental disclosure obligations. On June 9, 2016, by way of OSC Notice 11-775 Notice of 
                                                     
122 Ibid at 17. 
123 Ibid. Item 2 of Form 58-101F1 Corporate Governance Disclosure (Form 58-101F1) requires TSX-listed issuers to 
disclose the text of the board’s written mandate, or if the board does not have a written mandate, to describe how the 
board delineates its role and responsibilities. In this regard, there are two relevant disclosure requirements relating to 
board standing committees and audit committees: “(1) Board Standing Committees: All board standing committees 
should be identified and their function should be described, and (2) Audit Committees: The audit committee’s Charter 
should be disclosed in the AIF, which is particularly relevant where the audit committee has responsibility for 
responsibility risk management (which includes environmental risk).” Ibid. 
124 Ibid at 17-18. 
125 Ibid at 18. 
126 Ibid at 20. 
127 Ibid. As stated in the Notice, additional guidance regarding disclosure of forward-looking information is set out in 
CSA Staff Notice 51-330 Guidance Regarding the Application of Forward-Looking Information Requirements under NI 
51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations.  
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Statement of Priorities for Financial Year to End March 31, 2017, the Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC) stated that “commenters have suggested that the OSC find ways to work with” the TCFD and 
“consider how the OSC can encourage adoption of the Task Force’s recommendations.”128 In 
response, OSC emphasized that “companies already have an obligation to disclose material 
environmental and governance information,” but then committed to “assessing whether 
additional disclosure may be required,” which will include “monitoring and commenting” on the 
disclosure recommendations put forth by the TCFD.129 That commitment was echoed in the OSC’s 
latest Statement of Priorities (released on June 30, 2017).130  
 
On March 21, 2017, the CSA announced a “project to review the disclosure of risks and financial 
impacts associated with climate change”.131 As part of this project, the CSA committed to gathering 
information on climate change disclosure in Canada and abroad.132 The CSA was engaged in 
consultation and in gathering information throughout the spring and summer of 2017, and on April 
5, 2018, the CSA published Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate change-related Disclosure 
Project.  While the study offers some important data regarding what issuers are doing on climate-
related disclosure, it did not actually announce any new requirements. Regulators intend to 
“consider new disclosure requirements regarding non-venture issuers’ corporate governance 
practices in relation to material business risks including emerging or evolving risks and 
opportunities arising from climate change.”133  
 
The CSA disclosure review looked at the climate change-related disclosure of 78 large issuers from 
the S&P/TSX composite Index; it conducted an on-line survey of issuers; and it conducted 50 
consultations with reporting issuers, investors, advisors and other users of disclosure. It found that 
just over half of issuers examined provide specific climate change-related disclosure in their MD&A 
and/or Annual Information Form, but the other half used boilerplate disclosure, or no disclosure 
at all.134  More undertook some disclosure in their voluntary reports, but the majority disclose it as 
a regulatory risk.135 Almost none of the issuers reviewed disclosed their governance and risk 
management practices respecting climate change.  For the 58% of respondents to the issuer survey 
that indicated they do not disclose climate change-related information, their primary reasons were 
that “climate change-related risks are not material to the issuer at this time” and because there is 
a “lack of a common framework for measuring the impacts”, as well as their view that there is a 
“lack of interest on the part of the stakeholders.”136 While 43% of issuers specifically mentioned 
                                                     
128 Notice of Statement of Priorities for Financial Year to End March 31, 2017, OSC Notice 11-775, June 9, 2016, 39 
OSCB 5157. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Notice of Statement of Priorities for Financial Year to End March 31, 2018, OSC Notice 11-777, (2017) 40 OSCB 
5449. 
131 News Release: Canadian Securities Regulators Announce Climate Change Disclosure Review Project, CSA (21 March 
2017), online: https://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=1567.  
132 Ibid. 
133 Canadian Securities Administrators, CSA Staff Notice 51-354: Report on Climate change-related Disclosure Project, 
April 5, 2018, online:  http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20180405_climate-change-
related-disclosure-project.pdf 
134 Ibid, at 13..  
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid.,at 14. 
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physical climate change-related risks in their regulatory filings, most issuers did not quantify the 
potential financial impact of those risks. 137 
 
Investors had a quite different view of the disclosure landscape.  Substantially all users consulted 
were dissatisfied with the state of climate change-related disclosure and believe that 
improvements are needed, including that companies should disclose their governance and 
oversight of climate change-related risks and disclose whether they specifically considered climate 
change-related risks and opportunities in their materiality assessments.138  Many users suggested 
to the CSA that new regulatory disclosure requirements would be necessary to create any 
meaningful improvements.139 Moreover, many users supported the TCFD Recommendations in 
this regard.140  
 
At the end of the process, the CSA has agreed to do three things:  (1) “develop new guidance and 
consider additional initiatives to educate issuers with respect to the business risks and 
opportunities and potential financial impacts of climate change;”141 (2) consider proposed new 
disclosure requirements concerning “issuers’ governance processes in relation to material risks 
and opportunities, including the board’s responsibility for oversight and the role played by 
management; and disclosure of how the issuer oversees the identification, assessment and 
managements of material risks;”142 and (3) continue “to monitor the quality of issuers’ climate 
change-related disclosures and whether investors require additional types of information, such as 
disclosure of certain categories of greenhouse gas emissions, to make investment and voting 
decisions.”143   
 
D.  Evaluation: Current Disclosure Requirements in Canada 
 
The detailed summary of Staff Notice 51-333 above was undertaken to make a simple point: well-
meaning and well-counseled issuers have good, general, principles-based guidance on the 
disclosure of environmental issues in securities documents and financial statements.  What is 
lacking, however, is specific, clear, and comprehensive guidance on the disclosure of specific 
climate-related information.  There are obvious overlaps between the general environmental 
disclosure provisions emphasized in 51-333 and some of the aspects of the TCFD Framework.  In 
our view, disclosure in a single document as part of required filings according to the TCFD 
Framework would give investors a clearer, more consistent, and more easily comparable picture 
of how companies are thinking about, and managing, their current and future challenges from the 
changing climate and regulatory efforts to mitigate and adapt to those climatic changes. It is 
unfortunate that the CSA did not take the opportunity of more than a year of study to announce 
actual regulatory changes to align Canada’s disclosure requirements with the TCFD framework.  
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141 Ibid., at 33.  
142 Ibid., at 35. 
143 Ibid., at 37. 
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The CSA’s recognition of the need to address climate-related risk is an important first step, but is 
not nearly enough. 
 
Our view is significantly informed by a recent study undertaken by Chartered Professional 
Accountants of Canada (“CPA Canada”), a national organization with over 210,000 members in 
Canada and abroad.144  CPA Canada has recognized since 2008 that climate change has “significant 
implications for disclosures by public companies, both as a result of regulatory obligations and due 
to increased shareholder interest”.145  As part of its on-going policy work in this area, CPA Canada 
studied the climate-change disclosure practices of “75 listed companies, representing 
approximately 78% of the market capitalization of the S&P/TSX Composite Index across 10 major 
industries.”146  The study found that the majority (79%) of issuers were making some climate-
related disclosure, but the disclosure was generally inadequate: there were inconsistent uses of 
terminology; the information was not comparable within or between industries, 81% of issuers 
failed to provide specific disclosure about board or senior management oversight of climate-
related risks, the majority of issuers failed to provide financial metrics or targets for their strategies 
regarding climate-change risks, and so on.147  Only one-quarter of issuers discussed their strategies 
in light of the transition to a low-carbon economy148 envisioned by both the Paris Agreement and 
Canada’s Pan-Canadian Framework. When compared to the specific disclosure in the TCFD 
Framework about the governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets companies 
are using to evaluate and manage the risks and opportunities of the transition to a low-carbon 
economy, we argue that there are obvious gaps between what information investors are being 
provided with today, and what information they would be provided with if the TCFD Framework is 
incorporated into a National Instrument in Canada. 
 
 
IV.  Canadian Pension Funds’ Expectations Regarding Climate Disclosure 
 
Today, global investors have demonstrated in many ways that they consider environmental, 
social, and governance information, including climate-related information, to be economically 
significant information.  Investors with $60 trillion of capital are committed to incorporating ESG 
factors in their investing and voting decisions as part of the U.N. Principles for Responsible 
Investment (“PRI”).149  These include “ 27 Canadian asset owners, such as the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Plan, as well as 41 investment managers, such as AGF Investments, Manulife Asset Management 
                                                     
144 See CPA Canada, State of Play: Study of Climate-Related Disclosures by Canadian Public Companies, 2017, at 14, 
available at https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/financial-and-non-financial-
reporting/sustainability-environmental-and-social-reporting/publications/climate-related-disclosure-study (hereinafter 
“CPA Study”).  Data on CPA’s membership can be found in  About Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada, 
available at https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/the-cpa-profession/about-cpa-canada.  
145 CPA Canada, Executive Briefing Climate Change and Related Disclosures (March 2008) at 3, online: < 
https://www.cpacanada.ca/-/media/site/business-and-accounting-resources/docs/executive-briefing--climate-change-
and-related-disclosures.pdf> [Executive Briefing Climate Change Disclosures].  
146 See CPA Study, supra note 144, at 14.   
147 Ibid., at 2, Executive Summary. 
148 Ibid. 
149 About the PRI, U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment, available at https://www.unpri.org/about.   
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and RBC Global Asset Management.”150 Institutions, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and 
mutual funds with $95 trillion of invested capital support CDP’s annual survey of companies 
regarding their greenhouse gas emissions and strategies for addressing climate change.151  Global 
assets under management utilizing sustainability screens, ESG factors, and similarly motivated 
corporate engagement/shareholder action have risen 61% since 2012, to US $21.4 trillion at the 
start of 2014.152   
  
Compared to many other developed economies, the Canadian pension market is still 
overwhelmingly comprised of defined-benefit (“DB”) pension plans.  Thus, as of 2014, 85% of 
Canadian pension assets under management were held in DB plans; 10% in hybrid plans; and only 
4% in defined-contribution (“DC”) plans.153  By way of contrast, in the United States, 42% of 
pension assets under management are in DB plans, versus 58% in DC plans.154   Defined-benefit 
plans being primarily in the public sector and as provided by the federal government as part of Old 
Age Security,155 this concentration of pension assets under management draws attention to the 
policies and expectations of public pension funds in Canada for disclosure of climate-relevant 
information.  As public entities with responsibilities for the well-being of Canadians after 
retirement, we would expect that the transition risks of climate change would be particularly 
salient to these investors.  We will thus use the expressed views and policies of these public 
pension funds as illustrative of the expectations of Canadian long-term investors for enhanced 
climate disclosure, recognizing that not even all long-term investors will have given the issue 
sustained attention.  But to the extent that information is lacking for investors to make intelligent 
decisions about future trajectories, it will be the beneficiaries of those public pension funds, the 
citizens of Canada, who will be particularly poorly-served by such gaps. 
 
A recent report by a think tank in the United States, the Bretton Woods II project of New 
America, evaluated the investment policies of 300 sovereign wealth funds and public pension 
funds, and after detailed examination published a list of the “most responsible” 25 funds based on 
the fund’s commitment to incorporation of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) 
information, and disclosure of and accountability for such incorporation.156  Canada had more 
public pension funds on the list of responsible investment leaders than any other single country, 
including six: Alberta Investment Management Corporation (“AIMCo”), British Columbia 
Investment Management Corporation (“bcIMC”), Caisse de depot et placement du Québec 
(“CDPQ” or “la Caisse”), Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”), Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (“Teachers” 
or “OTPP”), and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (“PSP”).  In this section we discuss the 
                                                     
150 CPA Study, supra note 144, at 10, citing Principles of Responsible Investment Signatory Directory.  
151 Catalyzing business and government action, Carbon Disclosure Project, https://www.cdp.net/en-
US/Pages/AboutUs.aspx.  
152 Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review 2014 3, 7-8, available at 
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GSIA_Review_download.pdf 
153 See United Nations Environment Programme: Financial Institutions (“UNEP FI”), Fiduciary duty in the 21st Century, 
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expressed views of these leading funds regarding their expectations for climate change disclosure. 
These findings are based on a review of publicly-available information on each entity’s website, 
including statements of each entity’s expectations regarding disclosure, the institutions’ proxy 
voting policies and guidelines, and other general guidance notes and reports published by each 
entity. 
 
Although all of these Canadian responsible investment leaders have publicly committed to 
“support the voluntary recommendations of the industry-led Financial Stability Board Task Force 
on Climate-related Financial Disclosures” 157 and have, in some of their published reports, 
recognized the materiality of the risks and opportunities stemming from climate change, the 
breadth and depth of their discussions of the topic in published reports vary considerably. While 
some have provided more detailed information on the disclosure requirements expected from 
investee companies as well as the methods used to assess climate change risk (Caisse, CPPIB and 
Teachers, in particular), others limit the discussion to high level policy statements, either without 
providing any concrete information or restricting it to a specific asset type, industry or geography, 
which is unlikely to be representative of the whole portfolio and their overall climate change risk 
exposure.  One caveat here is that we are using the pension funds’ published reports and websites 
to analyze this issue, which probably do not reflect the full range of the funds’ activities, nor, 
certainly, their analytic methods.  Moreover, without more in-depth review and analysis, it is not 
possible to know to what extent funds’ published views are reflected in their actual investment 
strategies.  The funds’ views on climate risk and expectations regarding climate disclosure will be 
discussed in alphabetical order. 
 
A.  Alberta’s Investment Management Corporation  
 
Alberta’s Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo) was established in 2008 as a 
Crown Corporation to manage Alberta’s public sector pension assets, endowment, and 
government funds; as of December 31, 2016 it was managing $95.7 billion in assets.158  AIMCo 
includes ESG analysis across asset classes, stating that “the consideration of ESG factors and 
related information enables better investment decisions and supports long-term stakeholder 
value.”159  
 
AIMCo emphasizes climate change as a fundamental, systemic risk that is material to its 
evaluation of its portfolio across asset classes.160 As it has stated, “We recognize the business 
imperative of addressing climate change in our investing strategies, and view both the physical and 
the regulatory risks of climate change as material to our clients’ objectives.”161  Without specifically 
identifying companies in Alberta as at risk, AIMCo does conclude that “[t]he physical and regulatory 
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159 Ibid. at 1. 
160 See  AIMCo, Investment Philosophy: Strategic Response to Climate Change, available at                




impacts of climate change create stranded asset scenarios for companies, leading to possible 
solvency issues and shrinking the investible universe for investors.”162 To address material risks 
from climate change, AIMCo emphasizes ESG integration, engagement with companies “to 
promote climate-resilient strategies,” [i]nvesting to support lower carbon infrastructure, such as 
alternative energy solutions and eco-efficiencies to facilitate the transition to a lower carbon 
economy (Positively-themed ESG investments),” reporting on its portfolio activities, and 
“[p]articipation in collaborative initiatives and support for credible climate change policies and 
regulations based on achievable emissions reduction targets, water efficiency targets, alternate 
energy implementation strategies and industry best practices (Advocacy).”163 
 
Regarding proxy voting policies, AIMCo emphasizes its support for shareholder proposals 
on board quality, independence, diversity, and pay aligned with performance.164 It voted for 42% 
of environmental shareholder proposals, particularly those calling for increased disclosure of 
“environmental risk mitigation, performance and action on climate change.”165  On engagement, 
its key priorities are climate change, supply chain risks, shareholder voting rights, and women on 
boards,166 and it engaged with ATCO, Suncor, and Goldcorp, among Canadian issuers, on climate 
change and indigenous rights issues.167 Given both its proxy votes for better climate disclosure and 
its engagement priorities, it is logical to conclude that AIMCo would be well served by companies 
generally disclosing pursuant to the TCFD Framework. 
 
B.   British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (bcIMC)  
 
British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (bcIMC) “is the fourth largest fund 
manager in Canada, with $135.5 billion in funds under management as of March 31, 2017.168  It 
states that its investment approach is to invest “patient capital for the long term, seeking assets 
with strong cash flows to create long-term client wealth while managing risks . . . We believe that 
skills matter; environmental, social, and governance matters make a difference to long-term 
returns; and high standards of corporate behavior are fundamental to long-term, sustainable 
performance.”169  Thus “assessing investment risk, including that related to ESG, is integral to 
fulfilling our fiduciary duties.”170   
 
In 2015, bcIMC supported 75% of climate change proposals, many of which were seeking 
better disclosure.171  Consistent with this investment philosophy, climate change and water, 
human rights, and shareholder rights are bcIMC’s core engagement priorities, areas that present 
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“long-term, persistent business challenges.”172 Again, as with AIMCO, given bcIMC’s proxy voting 
record seeking more climate disclosure and its engagement priorities, it is logical to conclude that 
bcIMC would be well served by companies generally disclosing pursuant to the TCFD Framework. 
 
C. Caisse de depot et placement du Québec (CDPQ) 
 
In October 2017, Caisse de depot et placement du Québec (CDPQ), which manages $286 billion 
of public pension fund assets,173 publicly announced an ambitious investment strategy to address 
climate change.174  In announcing its strategy, CDPQ stated that its “investment strategy sets out 
targets and means for taking concrete and constructive action, as an investor, in the global 
challenge that the transition toward a low carbon economy represents.  This is a first step for 
CDPQ, which will be better positioned to seize profitable investment opportunities and contribute 
to the fight against climate change.”175 
 
The strategy CDPQ announced has four aspects: (1) Factoring climate change into every 
investment decision; (2) increasing its low-carbon investments by 50% by 2020, representing more 
than $8 billion in additional investments; (3) reducing its carbon footprint by 25% per dollar 
invested by 2025; and (4) exercising strong leadership in accounting for climate risk.176 Among the 
steps CDPQ has undertaken with respect to this latter point is to “participate in initiatives targeting 
transparency on climate change-related issues (e.g. TCFD, Principles for Responsible Investment, 
Montreal Carbon Pledge, CDP, Ceres).”177  Consistent with the TCFD recommendations, CDPQ will 
publish audited information on its portfolios’ GHG emissions when it publishes its annual report.178 
 
In order to enact its newly-announced strategy to factor climate into every investment decision 
it makes, CDPQ will need the high-quality information that disclosure according to TCFD’s 
Framework could potentially produce. 
 
D. Canadian Pension Plan 
 
The Canadian Pension Plan (“CPP”), managed in-house by the CPP Investment Board 
(“CPPIB”) is the largest pension fund in Canada and the eighth largest pension fund in the world, 
by net assets under management as of March 31, 2017,179 with over $316 billion in assets under 
management.180 The CPPIB is a federal Crown corporation and was established in 1997 under the 
Canada Pension Plan Investment Act.181  Its mandate is clear:  “CPPIB invests the assets of the CPP 
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with a singular objective – to maximize returns without undue risk of loss taking into account the 
factors that may affect the funding of the CPP [Canada Pension Plan].”182  In that regard, CPPIB 
“firmly believe[s] that organizations that manage environmental, social and governance factors 
effectively are more likely to endure and create more value over the long term than those that do 
not.”183     
 
 For over a decade, CPPIB has been pursuing a comprehensive approach to investing in 
light of the realities of climate change and “seeking enhanced disclosure  from large greenhouse 
gas emitters”.184  During fiscal 2017 it established a cross-departmental climate change working 
group (“CCWG”) “with the objective of better addressing climate change as a long-term investment 
consideration in the years ahead; and, incorporate[ing] climate change into our ERM Framework 
and semiannual enterprise risk reports to the Board of Directors.”185 CPPIB’s mandate is to review 
activities both from the top-down and the bottom-up and to embed climate change risk 
assessment in all investment activities. The work from the top includes a review of investment 
strategy across all of their asset classes to limit exposure to climate change risk, and from the 
bottom is working to integrate climate change risk considerations into individual investment 
decisions.186 CPPIB’s approach to climate risk is described as follows on its website: 
 
 
ANALYZE IDENTIFY SELECT ENGAGE 
 
Analyze climate 
change risks in our 
portfolio companies 
using internal and 








likelihood of success. 
  
 




proxy voting.  
 
Engage with 





 In light of these objectives, the CPPIB states that it is also actively engaging with regulators, 
intermediaries and the corporations in which it invests to lead and seek enhanced disclosure on 
environmental and climate-related topics. In additional to direct communication with individual 
corporations, it also uses a third-party, Hermes EOS, to engage companies on a range of climate-
change related issues; and it supports CDP (formerly entitled the Carbon Disclosure Project) as CDP 
seeks increased disclosure and management of climate change risks from the over 5,700 
companies with which CDP interacts.  In addition, CPPIB partnered with S&P Dow Jones Indices 
and RobecoSAM to develop the S&P Long-Term Value Creation (LTVC) Global Index, which aims at 
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facilitating the channeling of funds to companies that are better positioning themselves in terms 
of long-term value creation. The Long-Term Value Creation (LTVC) Global Index uses “both 
sustainability and financial quality criteria”. 188   
 
CPPIB’s Head of Sustainable Investing is one of the members on the Financial Stability 
Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures.  CPPIB has emphasized its 
participation in the Task Force as evidence of its recognition of this issue as one that presents long-
term risks and opportunities for investors.189 
 
In terms of proxy voting activity, CPPIB aggregates and publishes annual decision-making 
data. 190 During fiscal 2016, CPPIB supported 47 shareholder proposals related to enhanced climate 
change disclosure specifically, and 55/70 shareholder proposals for enhanced environmental and 
social disclosures generally.191 This figure includes the co-filing of shareholder resolutions requiring 
specific climate-related disclosures at the 2016 annual shareholder meetings of both Rio Tinto plc 
and Gencore plc.192  
  
E. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 
 
The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (“OTPP” or “Teachers’”) is the third largest pension 
fund in Canada and the twentieth largest pension fund in the world (by net assets under 
management as of December 31, 2014), with over $171 billion in assets under management. 
Teachers is an independent organization jointly sponsored by the Government of Ontario and the 
Ontario Teachers’ Federation.   
 
Teachers states that its  approach to climate change is based on four-pillars: (a) its fiduciary 
duty to pay pensions to current and future beneficiaries; (b) its responsibility to manage 
investment risks, which includes assessing climate change exposure; (c) its engagement with 
companies and policy makers, thus allowing it to use its influence to educate and encourage proper 
climate change risk policies, disclosures and management, and (d) its search for climate-friendly 
investment opportunities.193 
 
Teachers highlights the need to assess climate change risk at both macro (regulatory 
issues) and micro (company-specific issues) levels. Considering the range of investments it holds, 
it has grouped climate change risks into two areas: “risks from physical impacts of climate change 
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and risks from potential climate change regulations.”194 The first includes “water scarcity, rising 
temperatures, rising sea levels and more frequent or severe storms”, and can impact business 
directly and indirectly through “revenues, operations, expenses, supply chains and distribution”; 
while the second refers primarily to carbon policies, including carbon tax, cap and trade system 
and green technologies incentives.195        
 
Even though Teachers recognizes SASB’s “Sector Guidance” as a useful starting point for 
identifying key ESG factors, in order to improve consistency and comparability, Teachers has 
launched a guide mainly for oil and gas investee companies, which clarifies its expectations about 
ESG disclosures.  Its “desired format” of sustainability reporting is divided into two sections: (1) 
governance and (2) strategy and operations. It divides governance items into three subcategories, 
which it will engage reporting issuers on: (a) strong culture for responsible corporate behaviour, 
(b) appropriate prioritization of material sustainability factors, and (c) effective board oversight. It 
also divides its strategy and operations section into three subtopics on which it will engage 
reporting issuers: “(a) external actions on climate change that impact the company’s strategy or 
operations, (b) the impact or potential impact of the company’s strategy and operations on the 
environment and communities and (c) potential external/physical impacts on a company’s 
operations or strategy.”196  The guide includes a list of required information, the reasons for such 
requests and samples of best practices. Teachers states it has and will continue to seek and engage 
corporations in detailed discussions that show a systematic integration of relevant ESG 
considerations into corporate processes backed by appropriate metrics.  
 
Teachers notes specifically the TCFD as a promising development in financial report and 
states the principles from the Phase I report guide its requests for information from companies. It 
encourages companies to consider these principles when providing ESG disclosures.  It is also 
looking to reduce duplication and other inefficiencies in the current sustainability disclosure 
landscape.  
 
On the specific topic of the TCFD, Teachers opines that “While it is too soon to tell if the 
TCFD’s work will achieve its objectives, if successful, it would provide a single, globally-consistent, 
framework for financially-relevant disclosures for all organizations, including pension funds such 
as Ontario Teachers’, thereby reducing duplication and other inefficiencies in the current 
sustainability disclosure landscape.”197   
 
F.  Public Service Pension Investments (PSP) 
 
                                                     
194 Ibid. 
195 CLIMATE CHANGE: Separating the Real Risks for Investors from the Noise, available at  
https://www.otpp.com/documents/10179/20936/-/7726319b-b1cf-4bbc-8775-
7e3c6f28a858/Separating+the+Real+Risks+for+Investors+from+the+Noise.pdf 






Public Service Pension Investments  (“PSP”) manages the pension assets of public service 
employees such as the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the 
Reserve Force, currently valued at $135.6 billion.198  On its website in late October, PSP featured 
a press release  entitled “Institutional Investors Release Declaration on Financial Risks Related to 
Climate Change, ” in which $1.2 trillion of invested capital from Canada and abroad issued a 
declaration calling on companies to disclose climate related financial risk.199    Featured was PSP 
CEO André Bourbonnais in the following statement : “I am proud to see the financial community 
rallying around this key issue.  As institutional investors, we all have a role to play to promote 
increased transparency and better climate change disclosure practices from the companies we 
invest in.”200  This comment is consistent with PSP’s policy declarations seeking better climate 
disclosure, as articulated in its inaugural Responsible Investment report, published in 2017, in 
which it stated that “[t]he TCFD will help investors to access information on investment risks 
related to climate change.”201 
 
   G. Conclusion 
  
Leading public Canadian investors, who also are leading globally on ESG integration, are clear 
that climate change presents material risks and opportunities to long-term investors.  In order to 
take advantage of the opportunities, and mitigate the risks, better disclosure is required. We 
presume it is for that reason that Canada’s leading public pension investors have all endorsed the 
TCFD Framework for climate related financial disclosure.  
 
  
V.  Potential Liability for Inadequate or Misleading Climate-related Disclosure 
 
In this final section of the White Paper, we discuss potential claims against issuers and 
directors for climate-change related disclosure or non-disclosure.  This discussion is based on the 
securities requirements and National Instruments discussed in Section II above, and based on the 
state of current Canadian public companies disclosure as evaluated in the CPA Canada report 
discussed in Section III.  To frame this analysis, we start with an overview of current climate-related 
litigation in other jurisdictions.   
 
A. The Current State of Climate Change Legislation and Litigation  
 
A recent report published by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment offers an overview of current climate change legislation and litigation.202 First, both 
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climate change laws and climate change litigation are on the rise.  Between 2009 and 2013, climate 
change laws were passed at a rate of approximately 100 new laws per year globally; since 2013, 
the rate of passage of new laws has decreased to approximately 40 laws per year.203 Overall, 164 
countries have passed 1200 climate change laws and policies since the Kyoto Protocol was ratified 
in 1997.204 The Grantham Research Institute attributes the reduction in the number of laws being 
passed after 2013 to the fact that “most countries have in place at least rudimentary, and in many 
cases fairly comprehensive, climate change frameworks.”205  In general, climate change laws are 
either sector specific, such as regarding energy or forestry, or incorporate climate change 
considerations into wider concerns such as economic development or green growth.206   
 
Not surprisingly, the majority of laws that are sector specific focus on the energy industry.  Of 
the 164 countries surveyed in Grantham’s report, 88% had integrated some form of climate-
related considerations into their energy policies.207 These energy-related laws and policies account 
for 41% of the laws and policies included in the Grantham report dataset.208 In particular, these 
policies and laws focus on conservation, efficiency, and renewable energy.209  
 
Regarding litigation, the Grantham report categorized climate litigation according to its core 
objective, the four it identified being: (i) administration, (ii) protection/loss and damage, (iii) 
legislation/policies, and (iv) information/disclosure.210 Administration litigation challenges either 
the approval or lack of approval of particular projects or activities on the basis of climate change, 
such as coal-fired power plants or pipelines, water extraction, or housing developments, and is the 
most common type of litigation, representing 78% of the cases put before the courts.211 
Protection/loss and damage lawsuits deal with personal property damage or injury caused by 
climate change-related events; this category accounts for 8% of the total.212 Legislation/policies 
based litigation calls for new laws and policies or halts existing ones, and it accounts for 8% of the 
total.213 The final and smallest category of climate litigation (representing 7% of the total) is 
information/disclosure, which involves cases where the plaintiffs require further information from 
a government or firm.214 These cases typically involve “climate risk disclosure, or claims for 
                                                     
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid at 8. 
205 Ibid at 10. 
206 Ibid., at 11. 
207 Ibid., at 12.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid at 14. 
211 Ibid at 15. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid; As stated by the Grantham Institute, “these cases would typically be brought against governments in order to 
drive the course of climate change policies and regulation”. The Urgenda case in the Netherlands (2015) is the best 
example of this kind of litigation. In that case, the Hague District Court agreed with the claimant (Urgenda) and 
ordered the Dutch government to reduce the country’s emissions by at least 25% from 1990 levels by 2020, as 




misleading or incomplete information.”215 The Grantham report does not identify any of these 
information/disclosure related cases as having originated in Canada, and nor could we find any—
yet.216   
 
An analysis by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University and the United 
Nations Environment Program gives additional details on climate change litigation around the 
world.  It found that as of March, 2017, there were 884 climate change cases filed in 25 different 
countries, of which 654 were filed in the U.S. alone.217  A case was counted as a “climate change 
case,” in either administrative, judicial, or other investigative proceedings, where the case centrally 
raised “issues of fact or law” concerning “the science of climate change and climate change 
mitigation or adaptation,” and excluding incidental references to climate change.218   Thirteen of 
the cases are in Canada,219 although there was no discussion of them in the report.    
 
B.  Examples of Litigation and Potential Litigation 
 
We evaluate the litigation risks to issuers from the implications of  the transition to a low-
carbon economy by sketching out three potential kinds of litigation that might be possible in 
Canada where companies (1) fail to discuss financially material transition risks; (2) materially 
misstate the value of a company’s assets in light of “stranded assets” and unburnable carbon; or  
(3) materially misstate the risks of continued extraction and use of a high-carbon product such as 
oil, gas, or coal.   
 
1. Material omissions concerning transition risks:  Kinder Morgan Canada Ltd220 
 
On May 16, 2017, Greenpeace Canada submitted a complaint to the Alberta Securities 
Commission (“ASC”), the Ontario Securities Commission, and the CSA, alleging that Kinder Morgan 
Canada Ltd. (“Kinder Morgan”) failed to provide full, true, and plain disclosure of all material facts 
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in a prospectus being prepared to use to distribute its securities during an IPO announced on May 
10, 2017.221 This claim was grounded in two alleged breaches of securities laws: 
 
[1] that Kinder Morgan used out-dated oil demand projections, which may have potentially 
misled investors by portraying an overly optimistic view of the international oil market;222 
and 
[2] that Kinder Morgan failed to make adequate disclosures on the impact that climate change 
related risks may have on its business model.223 
 
In response to these alleged breaches, Greenpeace Canada made a formal request to the ASC 
asking it to halt Kinder Morgan’s efforts to raise money for the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline 
in the IPO until the company adequately disclosed climate change related risks to potential 
investors. The ASC stated that it would give the Greenpeace complaint “the consideration we deem 
appropriate.”224   
 
Greenpeace alleged that Kinder Morgan’s analysis in its prospectus of “climate policy risks” 
(or regulatory risks, as discussed in Section III, above) was incomplete. In particular, Greenpeace 
claimed that Kinder Morgan erred when it relied exclusively on the International Energy Agency’s 
(IEA) New Policies Scenario forecast that was most favourable to the company, in which future 
demand for oil continues to grow because aggressive climate policies are not adopted.225 
Greenpeace alleged that the inclusion of a single climate change scenario was materially 
misleading, given that the scenario which was used ignored other IEA scenarios that forecast 
decreased demand for oil if governments took actions to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal 
of keeping warming well below 2° Celsius.226  
 
Greenpeace argued that there are three risks to which Kinder Morgan is materially 
exposed should the global economy take meaningful action on climate change: 
 
• transition risks: i.e., the business and financial risks associated with the adjustment of the 
world economy from high carbon intensity to much lower carbon intensity over the 
coming years;227 
• business risks: i.e., increased operating costs, increased capital costs, the potential for 
assets (e.g. exploration licences, oil and gas reserves, or infrastructure required to develop 
those reserves) to become 'stranded', reputational damage and/or a reduced market 
valuation;228 and 
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• physical risks: i.e., the risk of the physical impacts of climate change (extreme weather, sea 
level rises, water scarcity) damaging the economic value in the business.229   
 
As discussed above, the CSA is evaluating the standards suggested by the TFCD with respect 
to disclosure of transition risks, but it is not expected to issue a report on the results of its 
evaluation until April of 2018 at the earliest.  Even without CSA’s explicit adoption or endorsement 
of the TCFD’s Framework for the disclosure of transition risks, however, the failure to incorporate 
transition risks into a prospectus could potentially be found to be a material omission.  Staff Notice 
51-333 does indicate that, under NI 51-102, issuers are required to consider business risks and 
physical risks that are likely to materialize. A full and robust exploration of these kinds of risks 
involves the holistic consideration of readily accessible market data. According to Greenpeace 
Canada, Kinder Morgan failed to address the ways in which it was exposed to climate-related 
business risks by ignoring the possibility that Canadian and international governments might adopt 
more stringent climate regulations. Furthermore, Greenpeace Canada argued that Kinder Morgan 
failed to meaningfully address the physical risks posed by climate change, particularly increasingly 
volatile weather events causing damage or increased expenses for oil extraction and transmission. 
These deficiencies were exacerbated by Kinder Morgan’s use of the IEA’s overly optimistic oil 
demand forecasts. 
 
Given recent policy moves in China and India aimed at boosting the use of electric vehicles, 
Greenpeace further argued that the IEA forecasts used by Kinder Morgan in its prospectus are 
outdated.230 The IEA has already expressed its intention to revise its estimates for oil demand 
downward.231 With Asiatic countries adopting more aggressive measures to reduce oil 
consumption, there is the potential that the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline (designed for the 
purpose of delivering oil to these markets) may become stranded at worst or, at the very least, 
greatly underperform Kinder Morgan’s targets. Thus, Kinder Morgan could be found to have 
breached securities laws requirements with respect to its future oriented financial information, as 
it would likely fail to meet the threshold of the information being substantively reasonable by 
forecasting future profits using outdated IEA models for global demand,232 and by failing to address 
the risk that demand may drop in Asian markets. 
 
In short, though Canadian law does not now specifically require a 2° Celsius scenario 
analysis, it may be the case that issuers are required to consider this scenario in the wake of the 
Paris Agreement. As it stands, issuers’ MD&A must consider and discuss the actual and potential 
material financial effects of identified trends or uncertainties, and the Paris Agreement is such an 
identified uncertainty: how will it translate into regulation, both domestically and globally?233  
Moreover, actions taken by jurisdictions such as China and India (among many others) to reduce 
oil consumption are an identified trend that needs to be discussed as well in an extractive issuer’s 
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MD&A.  Failing to do so, as Greenpeace alleged Kinder Morgan failed to do, could lead to litigation 
or liability risk under current Ontario provisions and national instruments.  
 
Subsequent to the Greenpeace complaint, Kinder Morgan changed its prospectus to include a 
discussion of additional climate risks, including physical risks from extreme weather and rising seas, 
as well as transition risks such as negative impacts on its business arising from national and 
international progress on meeting the Paris goal to reduce global demand for hydrocarbons.234   
We have identified no public information concerning whether the ASC asked for these changes. 
 
2. Overstating the Value of Stranded Assets  
 
Among the industries most vulnerable to disruption of their business model in the 
transition to a low-carbon economy are the oil, gas, and coal industries.  Carbon Tracker, U.N. 
Principles for Responsible Investment, and leading public institutional investors recently published 
a study of the value of “stranded assets,” those “unburnable” assets that must stay in the ground 
if the goal of keeping global temperature increases to 2℃ or less is to be met.235  Evaluating the 
stated economic value of the assets in the ground of 69 oil and gas companies, the report 
concluded that “across the oil and gas industry $2.3 trillion of upstream projects – roughly a third 
of business as usual projects to 2025 – are inconsistent with global commitments to limit climate 
change to a maximum 2˚C.”236  If an oil, gas, or coal company values its assets in the ground without 
serious discounting for the possibility that some significant percentage of those assets are 
“stranded,” because unburnable under their country’s commitments to the Paris Agreement, that 
company  can be materially misstating its financial position and business risks. 
 
A case was recently brought against ExxonMobil in the U.S. on this theory.  Here we briefly 
set out the allegations in that case, and then evaluate whether a similar case could be brought in 
Canada against Canadian oil or gas companies based on Canadian securities law. 
 
i.  Ramirez v. ExxonMobil 
 
On November 7, 2016, purchasers of Exxon Mobil’s common stock (from February 19, 2016 
to October 27, 2016, or the “Class Period”) filed a class action lawsuit against ExxonMobil (Exxon) 
seeking compensation for investor losses arising from a breach of securities law disclosure 
obligations.237 In particular, the complaint “alleges that throughout the Class Period, Exxon 
repeatedly highlighted the strength of its business model and its transparency and reporting 
integrity, particularly with regard to its oil and gas reserves and the value of those reserves.”238   
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  The complainants allege that Exxon’s public statements were materially false and misleading 
when made as they failed to disclose that:  
 
[1] “Exxon’s own internally generated reports concerning climate change recognized the 
environmental risks caused by global warming and climate change”;239 
[2] “given the risks associated with global warming and climate change, Exxon would not be 
able to extract the existing hydrocarbon reserves Exxon claimed to have and, therefore, a 
material portion of Exxon’s reserves were stranded and should have been written down”; 
and240 
[3] “Exxon had employed an inaccurate “price of carbon” – the cost of regulations such as a 
carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system to push down emissions – in evaluating the value of 
certain of its future oil and gas prospects in order to keep the value of its reserves 
materially overstated”.241 
 
The lawsuit claims that, during the class period, the price was artificially inflated by virtue of Exxon 
overstating the value of its assets, eventually reaching $95/share.242   
 
Towards the end of the class period, Exxon announced that the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was evaluating Exxon’s accounting for the value of its oil and gas 
reserves.  Then, “on October 28, 2016, before the open of trading, Exxon issued a release 
announcing its financial results for the quarter ended September 30, 2016.  Exxon disclosed that it 
might be forced to write down nearly 20% of its oil and gas assts.  Specifically, the Company 
acknowledged that it might have to write  down 3.6  billion  barrels  of  oil  sand  reserves  and  one  
billion barrels of other North American reserves that Exxon now conceded were not profitable to 
produce under current prices.”243 Once this information about Exxon’s potential write-down 
entered the marketplace, plaintiffs alleged that they suffered damages through a $2/share decline 
in the value of Exxon’s shares from its alleged artificially high price.244  
 
This litigation is proceeding, albeit slowly.  The Pennsylvania Carpenter’s Union Pension 
Fund, an institutional investor, was substituted as lead plaintiff, and an Amended Complaint filed 
on July 26, 2017.245  Exxon moved to dismiss on September 26, 2017, contending that there had 
been no material misstatements or omissions, plaintiffs responded on November 21, 2017.246   
 
ii. A stranded asset case in the Canadian context  
 
The recent Carbon Tracker/U.N. PRI report cited above suggests that there could be 
Canadian oil and gas companies currently at risk of overstating the value of their assets still in the 
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ground, and/or failing to discuss material transition risks in their MD&A.247  In that report, the 
capital expenditures currently underway or publicly announced by 69 oil and gas companies were 
analyzed to determine what percentage of those expenditures will be “stranded” if global efforts 
undertaken pursuant to the Paris Agreement to limit increases to 2 are successful.  Canadian oil 
and gas companies, perhaps not surprising, are at risk: 50-60% of Imperial Oil, Vermillion and 
Encana’s expenditures will become stranded, according to the analysis, and 40-50% of Husky’s and 
Suncor’s expenditures will also become stranded if regulators truly act to limit global warming to 
2℃.248    
 
In the Canadian context, it is likely that a company acting as Exxon is alleged to have acted 
would risk, at a minimum, being found to have misrepresented its business and by overstating its 
oil and gas prospects such that its forward-looking information misled investors.  Presumably there 
would also be implications for the accuracy of such a company’s financial statements, and the risk 
of material misstatements in the financial statements. 
 
 A Canadian company in Exxon’s position would likely be found to be in breach of its 
securities obligations in Canada for having failed to disclose that a significant portion of its 
hydrocarbon reserves were stranded as a result of the environmental risks imposed by climate 
change (i.e. an omission).  A company in Exxon’s position would also likely be liable for providing 
an untrue statement of a material fact.  In specific, such a company would likely be found to have 
breached securities laws requirements with respect to its future oriented financial information. In 
general, all information about the future offered in a disclosure document must be substantively 
reasonable. To reinforce this standard, NI 52-102 requires issuers to disclose the assumptions used 
to ground their assertions.249 Assuming a Canadian company did, in fact, overstate its oil and gas 
prospects in its forward looking information, Canadian securities regulators might find that such a 
company had failed to meet the threshold of substantive reasonableness in its assumptions about 
future regulatory efforts or the likely “price of carbon” and how those might affect its business and 
products.  Certainly a material overstatement of the value of assets would likely be considered 
influential in a reasonable investor’s decision whether or not to buy a company’s securities.250  
 
Though the above summary of the claims made (or claims that may possibly be made in 
the Canadian context) against Exxon or a comparable company is cursory, it provides some insight 
into how a complaint may be grounded in Canada if another issuer’s disclosure materials contained 
similar misrepresentations.251 The Ramirez case has just begun, yet while it proceeds, Exxon is 
                                                     
247 See Two Degrees of Separation, supra note 235. 
248 See Two Degrees of Separation, supra note 235, at 7.  These percentages for potentially stranded assets are 
comparable to some of the global oil majors:  Exxon is analyzed to risk 40-50% of its current and announced capex; 
Chevron 30-40%, and Royal Dutch Shell 30-40%. 
249 See NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations, Part 4A Forward-Looking Information. 
250 Ibid at 5. 
251 Note that NI 71-101 The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System permits a distribution of securities previously issued 
and distributed in the U.S. to be distributed in Canada, so long as the securities and the corresponding prospectus 
comply with U.S. securities laws (and vice versa). Under this system, documents incorporated in a U.S. filing are 
deemed to be incorporated in a multijurisdictional prospectus (s. 4.4). Under 71-101, there are several additional 
prospectus requirements for U.S. securities that are distributed in Canada. For details, refer to Part 3 and 4 of NI 71-
101. Some notable additional requirements include: legends indicating the prospectus is being prepared in accordance 
40 
 
suffering reputational damage. As of May 31, 2017, a 62% percent majority of Exxon shareholders 
voted in favour of a shareholder proposal calling on Exxon to assess and disclose how it is preparing 
its business for the transition to a low-carbon future.252 According to an article in the New York 
Times, Exxon’s management fought to sway investors to abandon the proposal up until the day of 
the shareholder meeting.253 At the least, it seems a majority of Exxon’s shareholders have lost 
confidence that Exxon’s disclosure is adequate for them to evaluate its business trajectory, 




3. Understating the Risks of Future Stranded Assets   
 
One additional type of claim that is proceeding in the United States against Exxon is that it 
materially misstated the risks of continuing use of its products, so continuing to extract, transport, 
and burn hydrocarbons with their attendant GHG emissions, while knowing that these actions 
risked the serious, long-term consequences of climate change.  This claim has been investigated 
since late 2015 by multiple state Attorneys General in the U. S., led by N.Y. A.G.  Eric Schneiderman 
and Massachusetts A.G. Maura Healey.  This type of claim obviously raises important issues of 
public policy, and First Amendment free speech defenses which, for purposes of our securities 
analysis, we will set aside for the moment, and concentrate on one aspect of the case that may 
have implications under both U.S. and Canadian securities laws:  Did Exxon materially misstate to 
its investors how it was incorporating the threat of carbon pricing in its forward planning?  With 
respect to this claim below, we will briefly set out the claim and legal argument for a violation 
under U.S. law, and then evaluate such a claim under Canadian securities law.   
 
There have been few details from the A.G.’s investigations about which specific aspects of 
Exxon’s statements are being investigated, although the general parameters are as stated above: 
that Exxon lied to its investors and to consumers about the risks of continuing to extract, transport, 
and burn oil and gas, which risks would have material consequences to its business that it omitted 
to state (both from the physical changes wrought by climate change and from regulatory efforts 
to mitigate those changes).  Recently, however, one strand of the N.Y. case has become public, 
and that is A.G. Schneiderman’s claim that it has uncovered evidence that Exxon was using one 
“proxy cost” of carbon in its forward planning that was significantly lower than the “proxy price” 
of carbon it was telling its investors, starting in 2010, that it was using in that planning.254 
 
                                                     
with U.S. law (s. 4.3(b)(i)), the reconciliation of financial statements so that they are in compliance with Canadian GAAP 
(s. 4.6), and the need for additional CEO, CFO, and board certifications (s. 4.7). 
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disclosure 
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  So, as described by Bloomberg News, “Schneiderman’s filing [seeking to compel production 
of additional documents and e-mails and to make an Imperial Oil company employee available for 
a deposition] focused on Exxon’s claim that it applies so-called proxy costs to greenhouse gas 
emissions, which the company says ‘reasonably approximates the range of potential future 
government actions with respect to climate change.’"255  Schneiderman said Exxon regularly cites 
the proxy costs [of $60 to $80 per ton of carbon in the future] to "assure investors that none of 
Exxon’s projects or assets will be materially affected [become stranded] by future climate change-
related regulations,"256 while, according to Schneiderman, Exxon is not actually using proxy costs 
in its internal planning, but for one “anomalous incident.”257 Schneiderman is also seeking the 
testimony of an employee of Exxon’s majority-owned Canadian subsidiary, Imperial Oil, who was 
alleged to have been told not to use any proxy cost in evaluating tar sands investments.258 
 
If these factual allegations are substantiated by the evidence, these would appear to be clear 
misstatements and/or omissions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under U.S. law. For private 
parties to bring that cause of action, they must allege and eventually prove that Exxon, acting with 
an intent to deceive investors or recklessness about the propensity of its statements to deceive 
investors, misstated material facts, or omitted to state material facts required to be disclosed, on 
which the plaintiffs relied in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, causing damages.259  
Plaintiffs here would likely contend exactly what A.G. Schneiderman apparently said in court: the 
very purpose of stating that it is using high proxy costs of carbon is to reassure investors that its 
assets will not become stranded, and that its capital expenditures for projects with a twenty to 
thirty to fifty year lifespan make sense.  The N.Y. A. G. has additional causes of action it can pursue 
under N.Y. state law, in particular the very powerful Martin Act cause of action.  The Martin Act 
requires only proof of the materiality of a misstatement or omission, and does not have a mens 
rea requirement or a showing of an intent to deceive or recklessness.260  
 
If claims of this sort (stating publicly that a realistic proxy cost of carbon had been used in 
analyzing capital expenditures for new development and projects, and it is substantiated that 
either no cost of carbon was used or an unrealistically low one was used) were to be brought 
against a Canadian issuer, what would the likely analysis be? First, it should be recognized that 
Canada is soon to have actual costs of carbon in most provinces, although they may be somewhat 
low, so it is possible that Canadian oil, gas, and coal companies would not have this problem.  It is, 
however, future costs of carbon that since 2010 Exxon said it was using in its forward planning, and 
which it allegedly wasn’t using.  If such claims were to be brought against a Canadian company, 
there could well be litigation and liability risk.  Material facts in Canada are defined objectively, and 
investors are entitled to “full, true, and plain disclosure” of “facts that would reasonably be 
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expected to significantly affect the market price or value of the securities.”261  Facts that could 
illuminate the likelihood that current capital expenditures would become wasted in the medium 
to long term would be likely to significantly affect the market price of a company’s securities today, 
particularly as long-term investors discounted the shares to reflect increased risks.  Thus it would 
be likely that securities risk would follow if a Canadian company engaged in the kinds of 





Presumably there are other kinds of claims that can, and perhaps will, be brought in Canada 
addressing material misstatements or omissions in companies’ prospectuses or continuing 
disclosure.  The primary risks are clear: stranded assets will need to be written down, financial 
values adjusted, and companies’ transition plans discussed in adequate detail for investors to make 
intelligent asset allocations. 
 
Canadian public investors have been judged to be global leaders in integrating sustainability 
factors, such as environmental, social, and governance data, in their investment, engagement, 
voting, and advocacy practices.  We urge Canada and its investors to also be public leaders in 
incorporating climate change risks and opportunities into capital market practices, and to lead 
developed countries in the direction of intentional low-carbon economies.  While this is a particular 
challenge in Canada, given the importance of oil, gas, and coal to the Canadian economy, that 
importance only underscores the need for issuers to develop cogent transition strategies, and for 
investors to have sufficient high-quality, comparable information to evaluate those strategies. 
                                                     

























                  
 
